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After assassinating the foremost Sri Lankan Tamil political leader and one-time Opposition leader Appapillai Amirthalingam and ex-Jaffna MP Vettivelu Yogeswaran, in July 1989, in Colombo, the LTTE declared those who stepped out of line, thereby deviated from policy of separate state, would be killed. Ex-Nallur MP Murugesu Sivasithamparam was shot and wounded in the same incident. In 1994, the LTTE ordered the boycott of the general election but EPDP leader Douglas Devananda contested. His party won nine seats in the Jaffna peninsula.
The LTTE also banned the singing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the national flag at government and public functions in Tamil areas. Devananda defied this ban, too.
The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) played a significant role in Sri Lanka’s overall campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The EPDP threw its weight behind the war effort soon after the LTTE resumed hostilities in June 1990 after India withdrew forces deployed in terms of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord signed on July 29, 1987, under duress, in the aftermath of the infamous uninvited ‘ parippu drop’ over northern Sri Lanka by the Indian Air Force, a modern-day New Delhi version of the Western gunboat diplomacy.
India ended its military mission here in late March 1990. Having conducted an unprecedented destabilisation project against Sri Lanka, India ceased the mission with egg on her face. The monument erected near Sri Lanka Parliament for over 1,300 Indian military personnel, who made the supreme sacrifice here, is a grim reminder of the callous project.
In fact, the United National Party (UNP) government reached a consensus with the EPDP, PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam), ENDLF (Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation) and EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front) for their deployment. Of them, the EPDP was among three groups ready to deploy cadres against the LTTE.
The LTTE ended its honeymoon (May 1989 to June 1990) with President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Within weeks after the resumption of hostilities, the government lost the Kandy-Jaffna A9 stretch of the road between north of Vavuniya and Elephant Pass.
It would be pertinent to mention that the above-mentioned groups suffered debilitating losses in the hands of the LTTE during the then Premadasa government’s honeymoon with the LTTE. At the behest of President Premadasa, the military provided tacit support for LTTE operations. But, in the wake of resumption of hostilities by the LTTE, the other groups grabbed the opportunity to reach consensus with the government, though they knew of President Premadasa’s treacherous actions.
On the invitation of the government, anti-LTTE Tamil groups set up ‘offices’ in Colombo. The writer first met Douglas Devananda at his ‘office’ at No. 22, Siripa Lane, Thimbirigasyaya, in November, 1990. There were scores of people. Some of them carried weapons. When Kathiravelu Nythiananda Devananda, wearing a sarong and short-sleeved banian, sat across a small table, facing the writer, he kept a pistol on the table. Devananda explained the role played by his group in Colombo and in the North-East region.
The so-called office had been used by the EPDP to question suspected LTTEers apprehended in Colombo. Those who are not familiar with the situation then may not be able to comprehend the complexity of overt and covert operations conducted by the military against Tiger terrorists. The EPDP, as well as other groups, namely the PLOTE and TELO, taking part in operations against the LTTE not only apprehended suspects but subjected them to strenuous interrogation. There had been excesses.
The UNP government provided funding for these groups, as well as weapons. In terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord signed on July 29, 1987, India and Sri Lanka agreed to disarm all groups, including the LTTE.
Following is the relevant section of the agreement: 2.9 The emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by Aug. 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the island within 48 hours of signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka.
Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the Army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25 May 1987. The process of surrendering arms and the confinement of security forces personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.
An ex-colleague of Devananda, now living overseas, explained the circumstances of the one-time senior EPRLF cadre, EPDP leader switched his allegiance to the Sri Lankan government. Devananda formed the EPDP in the wake of a serious rift within the top EPRLF leadership. However, Devananda, at the time he had received training in Lebanon as a result of intervention made by UK based Tamils, served the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS). Subsequently, a group that included K. Padmanabah formed the General Union of Students (GUES) before the formation of the EPRLF.
The formation of the EPDP should be examined taking into consideration Devananda’s alleged involvement in Diwali-eve murder in Chennai in 1986. Devananda’s ex-colleague claimed that his friend hadn’t been at the scene of the killing but arrived there soon thereafter.
Devananda, who had also received training in India in the ’80s, served as the first commander of the EPRLF’s military wing but never achieved a major success. However, the eruption of Eelam War II, in June, 1990, gave the EPDP an unexpected opportunity to reach an agreement with the government. In return for the deployment of the EPDP in support of the military, the government ensured that it got recognised as a registered political party. The government also recognised PLOTE, EPRLF and TELO as political parties. President Premedasa hadn’t been bothered about their past or them carrying weapons or accusations ranging from extrajudicial killings to extortions and abductions.
Some of those who found fault with President Premadasa for granting political recognition for those groups conveniently forgot his directive to then Election Commissioner, the late Chandrananda de Silva, to recognise the LTTE, in early Dec. 1989.
The writer was among several local and foreign journalists, invited by the late LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham, to the Colombo Hilton, where he made the announcement. Chain-smoking British passport holder Balasingham declared proudly that their emblem would be a Tiger in a red flag of rectangular shape. Neither Premadasa, nor the late Chandrananda de Silva, had any qualms about the PFLT (political wing of the LTTE) receiving political recognition in spite of it being armed. The LTTE received political recognition a couple of months before Velupillai Prabhakaran resumed Eelam War II.
Devananda, in his capacity as the EPDP Leader, exploited the situation to his advantage. Having left Sri Lanka for India in May 1986, about a year before the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, Devananda returned to the country in May 1990, a couple of months after India ended its military mission here.
Of all ex-terrorists, Devananda achieved the impossible unlike most other ex-terrorist leaders. As the leader of the EPDP and him being quite conversant in English, he served as a Cabinet Minister under several Presidents and even visited India in spite of the Madras High Court declaring him as a proclaimed offender in the Chennai murder case that happened on Nov. 1, 1986. at Choolaimedu.
Regardless of his inability to win wider public support in the northern and eastern regions, Devananda had undermined the LTTE’s efforts to portray itself as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people. In 2001, the LTTE forced the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK)-led Tamil National Alliance (TNA) to recognise Velupillai Prabhakaran as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people.
Whatever various people say in the final analysis, Devananda served the interests of Sri Lanka like a true loyal son, thereby risked his life on numerous occasions until the military brought the war to a successful conclusion in May 2009. Devananda’s EPDP may have not participated in high intensity battles in the northern and eastern theatres but definitely served the overall military strategy.
During the conflict and after the EPDP maintained a significant presence in Jaffna islands, the US and like-minded countries resented the EPDP as they feared the party could bring the entire northern province under its domination by manipulating parliamentary, Provincial Council and Local Government elections. The West targeted the EPDP against the backdrop of the formation of the TNA under the late R. Sampanthan’s leadership to support the LTTE’s macabre cause, both in and outside Parliament. At the onset, the TNA comprised EPRLF, TELO, PLOTE and even TULF. But, TULF pulled out sooner rather than later. The EPDP emerged as the major beneficiary of the State as the LTTE, at gun point, brought all other groups under its control.
During the honeymoon between the government and the LTTE, the writer had the opportunity to meet Mahattaya along with a group of Colombo-based Indian journalists and veteran journalist, the late Rita Sebastian, at Koliyakulam, close to Omanthai, where LTTE’s No. 02 Gopalswamy Mahendrarajah, alias Mahattaya, vowed to finish off all rival Tamil groups. That meeting took place amidst a large-scale government backed campaign against rival groups, while India was in the process of de-inducting its troops (LTTE pledges to eliminate pro-Indian Tamil groups, The Island, January 10, 1990 edition).
Devananda survives two suicide attacks
The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) worked out by Norway in 2002, too, had a clause similar to the one in the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987. While the 1987 agreement envisaged the disarming of all Tamil groups, the Norwegian one was meant to disarm all groups, other than the LTTE.
Devananda’s EPDP had been especially targeted as by then it remained the main Tamil group opposed to the LTTE, though it lacked wide public support due to the conservative nature of the Tamil society to fall in line with long established parties and their leaders. A section of the Tamil Diaspora that still couldn’t stomach the LTTE’s eradication were really happy about Devananda’s recent arrest over the recovery of a weapon issued to him by the Army two decades ago ending up with the underworld. The weapon, issued to Devananda, in 2001, was later recovered following the interrogation of organised criminal figure ‘Makandure Madush’ in 2019. Devananda has been remanded till January 9 pending further investigations.
Being the leader of a militant group forever hunted by Tiger terrorists surely he must have lost count of all the weapons he received on behalf of his party to defend themselves. Surely the Army has lost quite a number of weapons and similarly so has the police, but never has an Army Commander or an IGP remanded for such losses. Is it because Devananda stood up against the most ruthless terrorist outfit that he is now being hounded to please the West? Then what about the large quantities of weapons that Premadasa foolishly gifted to the LTTE? Was anyone held responsible for those treacherous acts?
Then what action has been taken against those who took part in the sinister Aragalaya at the behest of the West to topple a duly elected President and bring the country to its knees, as were similar putsch in Pakistan, Bangladesh effected to please white masters. Were human clones like the ‘Dolly the Sheep’ also developed to successfully carry out such devious plots?
Let me remind you of two suicide attacks the LTTE planned against Devananda in July 2004 and Nov. 2007. The first attempt had been made by a woman suicide cadre later identified as Thiyagaraja Jeyarani, who detonated the explosives strapped around her waist at the Kollupitiya Police station next to the Sri Lankan Prime Minister’s official residence in Colombo killing herself and four police personnel, while injuring nine others. The woman triggered the blast soon after the Ministerial Security Division (MSD) assigned to protect the then Hindu Cultural Affairs Minister Devananda handed her over to the Kollupitiya police station on suspicion. Investigations revealed that the suicide bomber had been a servant at the Thalawathugoda residence of the son of a former UNP Minister for about one and half years and was considered by the family as an honest worker (Bomber stayed with former UNP Minister’s son, The Island, July 12, 2004).
She had been planning to assassinate Devananda at his office situated opposite the Colombo Plaza. The police identified the person who provided employment to the assassin as a defeated UNP candidate who contested Kandy district at the April 2004 parliamentary election.
The second attempt on Devananda was made at his Ministry at Narahenpita on 28 Nov. 2007. Several hours later, on the same day, the LTTE triggered a powerful blast at Nugegoda, killing 10 persons and causing injuries to 40 others. The bomb had been wrapped in a parcel and was handed over to a clothing store security counter and detonated when a policeman carelessly handled the parcel after the shop management alerted police.
Having lost control of areas it controlled in the Eastern Province to the military by July 2007, the LTTE was battling two Army formations, namely 57 Division commanded by Brigadier Jagath Dias and Task Force 1 led by Colonel Shavendra Silva on the Vanni west front. The LTTE sought to cause chaos by striking Colombo. Obviously, the LTTE felt quite confident in eliminating Devananda, though the EPDP leader survived scores of previous assassination attempts. Devananda had been the Social Welfare Minister at the time. The Minister survived, but the blast triggered in his office complex killed one and inflicted injuries on two others.
Hardcore LTTE terrorists held at the Jawatte Jail, in Kalutara attacked Devananda on June 30, 1998, made an attempt on Devananda’s life when he intervened to end a hunger strike launched by a section of the prisoners. One of Devananda’s eyes suffered permanent impairment.
Having served as a Jaffna District MP for over three decades, Devananda failed to retain his seat at the last parliamentary election when the National People’s Power (NPP) swept all electoral districts. The NPP, in fact, delivered a knockout blow not only to the EPDP but ITAK that always enjoyed undisputed political power in the northern and eastern regions. Devananda, now in his late 60, under the present circumstances may find it difficult to re-enter Parliament at the next parliamentary elections, four years away.
Devananda first entered Parliament at the 1994 August general election. He has been re-elected to Parliament in all subsequent elections.
The EPDP contested the 1994 poll from an independent group, securing just 10,744 votes but ended up having nine seats. The polling was low due to most areas of the Jaffna peninsula being under LTTE control. But of the 10,744 votes, 9,944 votes came from the EPDP-controlled Jaffna islands. Devananda managed to secure 2,091 preference votes. That election brought an end to the 17-year-long UNP rule. By then Devananda’s first benefactor Ranasinghe Premadasa had been killed in a suicide attack and Devananda swiftly aligned his party with that of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s People’s Alliance (PA).
The LTTE mounted an attack on Devananda’s Colombo home on the night of Oct. 9, 1995. It had been one of 12 such attempts on his life
Devananda, who had survived the July 1983 Welikada Prison riot where Sinhala prisoners murdered 53 Tamils detainees. He then got transferred to Batticaloa Prison from where he escaped along with 40 others in September of the same year, received his first Cabinet position as Minister of Development, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the North, and Tamil Affairs, North and East following the 1994 general election. Devananda lost his Cabinet position following the PA’s defeat at the 2001 parliamentary election. Devananda entered the Cabinet as the Minister of Agriculture, Marketing Development, Hindu Education Affairs, Tamil Language & Vocational Training Centres in North following the UPFA’s victory at the 2004 general election.
Devananda further consolidated his position during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s presidency (2005 to 2015). He earned the wrath of the LTTE and Tamil Diaspora for his support for the government that eradicated the LTTE. Over the years, the EPDP’s role in overall security strategy diminished though the group maintained a presence in Jaffna islands.
There had been accusations against the EPDP. There had also been excesses on the part of the EPDP. But, Devananda and his men played an important role though not in numbers deployed against the LTTE. The EPDP proved that all Tamils didn’t follow the LTTE’s destructive path.
Three years after the eradication of the LTTE, in May 2009, President Mahinda Rajapaksa sent Devananda to the UN Human Rights Council as part of the official government delegation to Geneva.
Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka, Ambassador/ Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office in Geneva, comment on Devananda’s arrest is a must read. Devananda’s fate would have been different if he remained with the EPRLF, one of the Indian backed terrorist groups installed as the first North East Provincial Administration in which Jayatilleke served as Minister of Planning and Youth Affairs.
The EPRLF administration was brought to an unceremonious end when India ended its military mission here in 1990.
While multiple LTTE attempts to assassinate Devananda failed during the war with the last attempt made in late 2007, less than two years before the end of the conflict, obviously the EPDP leader remains a target. Those who still cannot stomach the LTTE’s humiliating defeat, seem to be jubilant over Devananda’s recent arrest over a missing weapon.
Therefore it is incumbent upon the NPP/JVP government to ensure the safety of Devananda under whatever circumstances as he has been a true patriot unlike many a bogus revolutionary in the present government from top to bottom, who are nothing more than cheap opportunists. Remember these same bogus zealots who threatened to sacrifice their lives to fight Indian threat to this country, no sooner they grabbed power became turncoats and ardent admirers of India overnight as if on a cue from Washington.
Various interested parties, including the US, relentlessly targeted the EPDP. US Embassy cable originating from Colombo quoted Stephen Sunthararaj, the then-Coordinator for the Child Protection Unit of World Vision in Jaffna directing a spate of allegations against the EPDP. In attempting to paint black the relationship between the military and the EPDP, Sunthararaj even accused the latter of child trafficking, sexual violence and running Tamil prostitution rings for soldiers.
The diplomatic cable also quoted the World Vision man as having said… because of the large number of widows in Jaffna, men associated with the EPDP, often from neighbouring villages, are used to seduce women with children, especially girls, with the promise of economic protection. After establishing a relationship, the men then take the children, sometimes by force and sometimes with the promise that they will be provided a better life.
The children are sold into slavery, usually boys to work camps and girls to prostitution rings, through EPDP’s networks in India and Malaysia.”
It would be interesting to examine whether World Vision at any time during the conflict took a stand against the use of child soldiers and indiscriminate use of women and children in high intensity battles and suicide missions by the LTTE. Did World Vision at least request the LTTE not to depend on human shields on the Vanni east front as the area under LTTE control gradually shrank? Have we ever heard of those who had been shedding crocodile tears for civilians opposing the LTTE’s despicable strategies? Never.
Against the backdrop of such accusations the non-inclusion of Devananda in some sanctioned list is surprising. Devananda, however, is receiving the treatment meted out to those Tamils who opposed the LTTE or switched allegiance to the government. Ex-LTTE Pilleyan and his one-time leader Karuna are among them. But unlike them, Devananda never served the LTTE’s despicable cause.
Historical context of politicisation of Mahavamsa, and Tamil translation of the last volume
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Last week’s Midweek piece, headlined ‘Nobel Peace Prize for Pillay draws global attention to Eelam War,’ prompted one of the writer’s ex-colleagues, now serving a foreign media group, to raise the failure on the part of Sri Lanka to achieve genuine post-war reconciliation and real development (https://island.lk/nobel-peace-prize-for-pillay-draws-global-attention-to-eelam-war/).
He raised pertinent questions: But what next? … nearly two decades after the ‘liberation’ from terrorism, have we achieved economic progress like Singapore? Sri Lanka still exports poor women, mainly young Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim mothers, as vulnerable housemaids, to West Asia for menial wages. Another issue, he raised, was Sri Lanka’s pathetic response to the recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation (LLRC) Commission, appointed by war-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa.
There is no doubt they were valid questions. What/Who made genuine reconciliation unachievable? Can war-winning Sri Lanka justify its catastrophic inability to deal with all post-war issues? But, perhaps, one of the most important issues is whether the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) should be solely held responsible for the chaotic reconciliation efforts, amidst relentless hounding of the war- winning leaders and the government for defying the West and defeating the world’s most ruthless terrorist organisation, as identified by none other than the American Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Having eradicated the battle-hardened Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), widely considered, by so called pundits, undefeatable, in the battlefield itself, war-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa paved the way for genuine reconciliation by offering amnesty to all those who fought for the group. Although that amnesty quite rightly excluded LTTE cadres, who had been indicted for major crimes during the conflict, the general amnesty allowed them to be rehabilitated. Approximately 12,000 LTTE cadres benefited.
It would be pertinent to mention that President Rajapaksa caused himself immense harm and also undermined the whole political party system by the enactment of the 18th Amendment for him to seek presidency for third time, in 2015, and the impeachment of CJ Dr. Shirani Bandaranayke in 2013.
The international community, in general, supported Sri Lanka’s efforts to rehabilitate ex-LTTE cadres. IOM Chief of Mission Richard Danziger, in an interview with the writer, in late Nov. 2011, emphasised the pivotal importance of rehabilitation of ex-LTTE cadres. That exclusive interview, arranged by a friend of mine, Prabath Fernando, at the time on the IOM staff, gave an insight into what was happening on the ground (https://thuppahis.com/2011/12/01/iom-clarifies-role-in-reintegrating-tigers-into-society/).
Interested parties reacted angrily to Danziger’s comments. They felt betrayed by the top IOM representative’s support to the military-led project. Obviously, they realised the danger to themselves in the international recognition for GoSL’s flagship project.
The then Justice and Law Reforms Minister Milinda Moragoda played a significant role in the project. The former UNPer invited the All Ceylon Hindu Congress (ACHC) to participate in the GoSL effort, thereby giving confidence to the Tamil community and the Tamil Diaspora. Moragoda went to the extent of making special arrangements for married LTTE personnel. A section of the government may not have liked Moragoda’s status but no one else could have done a better job. On the invitation of Moragoda, the writer had the opportunity to visit Vavuniya where ex-LTTEers were undergoing rehabilitation. Top ACHC representatives were among those present.
But, those who couldn’t stomach the LTTE’s defeat worked overtime to undermine the reconciliation process. They also couldn’t bear up the emergence of Mahinda Rajapaksa as the undisputed leader. As the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, President Rajapaksa achieved the unthinkable. Under his leadership, the armed forces not only eradicated the LTTE’s conventional fighting capacity but implemented an unprecedented rehabilitation project that gave those who believed in a separate state confidence to start a new life.
The rehabilitation of the LTTE should have been the foundation of the reconciliation process. A real consensus could have been achieved. But, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) steadfastly refused to cooperate with the GoSL. The late R. Sampanthan-led TNA demanded that GoSL be hauled up before the international war crimes tribunal. Had the TNA accepted the rehabilitation of LTTE cadres as a key Confidence Building Measure (CBM), it could have quickly reached consensus with the GoSL. Instead, the TNA refused to acknowledge the rehabilitation project. The TNA despised the GoSL’s triumph over the LTTE so much, it conveniently forgot that the armed forces’ victory freed the party from the clutches of Velupillai Prabhakaran.
The TNA remained under LTTE’s control since 2001 when Sampathan was compelled to recognise the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people.
The Nobel Peace Prize for Pillay prompted Dr. Jehan Perera, on behalf of one-time darling of the Norwegians, the National Peace Council (NPC), headed by him, to declare that the Nobel Peace Prize to Navanethem Pillay is a reminder to Sri Lanka of unfinished commitments.
Those demanding an explanation for GoSL’s post-war failure, and finding fault with successive governments, refuse to examine political developments that undermined the post-war reconciliation process. Having believed in the LTTE taking the upper hand in the northern theatre of operations, though the group vacated the East by June/July 2007, Western governments, the UN and the civil society groups struggled to cope up with the developing situation. The 2010 presidential election, the first national election after Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE, placed the main Opposition UNP in an extremely embarrassing position. Having undermined the war effort, the UNP couldn’t have faced the electorate under any circumstances.
The UNP’s US-backed move to entice war-winning Army Chief, retired General Sarath Fonseka, to contest the presidential election, delivered a knockout blow to the political party system. That utterly contemptible move had a ripple effect. It caused unlimited chaos and led to the overall deterioration of the political environment. The project involved the UNP, TNA and the JVP. They sank their differences to reach consensus under West’s prodding. At the behest of the TNA, the Tamil electorate voted for Fonseka who won all predominately Tamil-speaking electoral districts in the North and East, whereas Mahinda Rajapaksa won the vast majority of other districts. Fonseka lost by a staggering 1.8 mn votes.
Fonseka’s superlative performance in the North and East should have brought an immediate end to war crimes accusations. The GoSL bashing at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) seemed nothing but a joke after the main Tamil party, with 22 parliamentary seats in the North and East, backed Fonseka after accusing him and his army of genocide. Surprisingly, President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government never bothered to mention that at the right forum.
Years later, in the run-up to the 2015 presidential election, Sampanthan acknowledged how the eradication of the LTTE, in 2009, saved his party. The veteran politician had no qualms in appreciating the LTTE’s defeat when the writer raised the issue with him. The late D.B.S. Jeyaraj posted The Island report on his website (https://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/?p=36839) .
But, the TNA continued to pursue what can be safely described as a destructive strategy. After Fonseka’s defeat, the UNP unceremoniously dropped him. A desperate defeated presidential election candidate had no option but to team up with the JVP at the 2010 April parliamentary polls. Under the JVP-Fonseka leadership, the Democratic National Alliance (DNA) won seven seats.
Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE further divided the country. Although Sampanthan had to acknowledge, years later, that his party was saved from the LTTE dictates, he was not at all willing to reach consensus with the GoSL. However, even the European Union publicly declared that the TNA had been able to win the lion’s share of seats, at the 2004 parliamentary polls, with the LTTE stuffing ballot boxes for TNA candidates. The EU made that shocking declaration in its final report on the 2004 parliamentary poll. The EU’s condemnation deeply embarrassed the TNA but the likes of Sampanthan had thick skins.
The TNA increased hostilities following the 2010 parliamentary polls. The 2010 poll brought the TNA down to 14 seats, from 22 secured at the 2004 election. The drop in its popularity compelled the TNA to harden its stance against President Rajapaksa. It rejected the President’s efforts to kick start negotiations, with the backing of India. Instead, the TNA continued its alliance with the UNP and the JVP and reached consensus on Maithripala Sirisena as the common candidate at the 2015 presidential election.
During President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term (2010 January to 2015 January) the government couldn’t make progress in the post-war reconciliation process. The TNA that directly benefited from LTTE terrorism directed at other political parties in the North and East, fully backed the group until the very end. Sampanthan never bothered to ask the LTTE to give up human shields or halt forcible child recruitment. In fact, none of those, now demanding accountability on the part of GoSL, asked the LTTE to give up resistance, at least after the LTTE suffered irreparable losses at the Anandapuram battle. The April 2009 battle effectively ended the LTTE capacity to wage conventional resistance.
The TNA, in February 2012, accused the GoSL of failing to implement recommendations made by its own LLRC. The LLRC recommendations though failed to meet high expectations of the TNA and like-minded groups/parties gave the government some opportunity to address their grievances. But, the government failed to act on key recommendations.
President Rajapaksa appointed the LLRC in response to the UN probe. He understandably refused to cooperate with the UN. Instead, the President appointed LLRC but still failed to implement its recommendations. For want of sound advice, President Rajapaksa rejected the UN probe fearing its bias, thereby deprived the country of an opportunity to set the record straight.
There is no point in denying the fact that the war- winning government mishandled the issue. GoSL’s foolish approach allowed those propagating lies to advance their strategy. Years later, when Lord Naseby, through the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), obtained and disclosed classified dispatches from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) regarding the final phase of the offensive (January to May 2009), exposed the utterly ill-informed decision to boycott the UN probe.
The dispatches from the British High Commission, in Colombo, during that period when examined with public declaration by wartime US Defence Advisor, in Colombo, Lt. Colonel Lawrence Smith, in June 2011, strongly disputed the much touted unsubstantiated UN claim of at least 40,000 civilian deaths.
Let me reproduce the paragraph, bearing No 137, verbatim: “In the limited surveys that have been carried out in the aftermath of the conflict, the percentage of people reporting dead relatives is high. A number of credible sources have estimated that there could have been as many as 40,000 civilian deaths. Two years after the end of the war, there is no reliable figure for civilian deaths, but multiple sources of information indicate that a range of up to 40,000 civilian deaths cannot be ruled out at this stage. Only a proper investigation can lead to the identification of all of the victims and to the formulation of an accurate figure for the total number of civilian deaths.”
In fact, Lord Naseby’s disclosure, made in Oct. 2017, during the treacherous Yahapalana administration when considered with British and US position on the final phase of the offensive, in a way confirmed the UN findings that placed the number of dead, both civilians and LTTEers way below Marzuki Darusman’s 40,000 deaths figure. Darusman, one-time Indonesian Attorney-General in the notorious Suharto government, led the three-member UN accountability panel that unilaterally declared that the accusations couldn’t be investigated for 20 years from the date it was released. That report was released in March 2011.
Successive governments owed explanations why a confidential UN report, that dealt with the Vanni offensive, had never been used in the defence of our armed forces. Although the UN publicly acknowledged the existence of the report, Sri Lanka never made an attempt to use it for our own defence. The UN acknowledged the report dealt with the situation in the Vanni during August, 2008, to May 13, 2009. The report placed the number of persons killed, and wounded, during this period, at 7,721 and 18,479, respectively. There cannot be a better detailed account than the UN report as it was based on information provided by NGOs, ICRC, as well as numerous other sources trapped in the war zone.
For some strange reason successive governments failed to use irrefutable available information to counter lies propagated against Sri Lanka by interested parties.
As ground forces advanced steadily into LTTE-held territory, President Rajapaksa requested for immediate deployment of an Indian medical team to treat the wounded people evacuated from Puthumathalan. India responded swiftly. By the second week of March 2009, India stationed a medical team that treated several thousand men, women and children at Pulmoddai, north of Trincomalee. The writer was among a group of journalists allowed to visit the Indian medical facility after observing the transfer of the wounded from Puthumathalan to Pulmoddai from an Israeli built Fast Attack Craft (FAC). The transfer of the wounded and helpers took place under the direct supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
If the GoSL planned to commit genocide, it wouldn’t have invited India to position a medical team, widely believed to be military/ex-military, at Pulmoddai. Once the LTTE collapsed, the Indian team moved to Menik Farm, the main displaced receiving centre where it remained busy until the situation was brought under control. Those who accused Sri Lanka of waging war, without witnesses, conveniently forgot that the ICRC and Indian team operated among the Tamil community throughout this period. But, Sri Lanka pathetically failed to build its defence on the basis of strong evidence to prove allegations wrong.
The TNA and other Tamil parties disregarded developments on the ground. While they propagated blatant lies, including that GoSL held Tamil political prisoners, post-war Chief Minister of the Northern Province C.V. Wigneswaran suddenly alleged that GoSL had poisoned 104 LTTE cadres undergoing rehabilitation.
The former Supreme Court judge made that preposterous accusation during the Yahapalana government when US troops were engaged in a training exercise with local counterparts in the Jaffna peninsula. That lie attracted international attention. The government did nothing. Wigneswaran enjoyed international media attention at the country’s expense.
During the same time, TNA and other interested parties, backed by some Western embassies, particularly the British and German, threw their weight behind the Mannar mass grave accusations. They were proved utterly wrong when Sri Lanka got a US lab to conduct carbon dating testing on the finds. But by the time US results were released, Geneva had reiterated allegations and speculated about more mass graves.
But no one asked for justice for thousands of people killed by the LTTE. Have you ever heard of them speaking of the 1989 assassination of TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingam or Vettivelu Yogeswaran while having talks with President Ranasinghe Premadasa in Colombo? Or Neelan Thiruchelvam killed in late July 1999 in Colombo? All Tamils killed by the LTTE were discarded as traitors. The first female Mayor of Jaffna, Sarojini Yogeswaran, was shot dead at her home in Jaffna, on 17 May, 1998, three years after the LTTE withdrew from the Jaffna peninsula.
Sri Lankan armed forces can quite rightly be proud of wiping out the LTTE. Those who fought for the LTTE, until the very end, and either surrendered or were arrested by the military and police in 2009, would definitely recognize the signal victory achieved by the armed forces. But, those who threw their weight behind the separatist agenda, after having taken refuge overseas or played politics with the conflict, seemed hell-bent on taking revenge on the war-winning armed forces.
Why shouldn’t we be happy over the eradication of a group that not only challenged Sri Lanka’s unitary status but massacred thousands of their own, leaving aside the innocent Sinhalese and Muslims killed by them, in a bid to consolidate its hold on the North-East electorates? The deaths of over 1,000 Indian soldiers and injuries to over 2,000 during their deployment here, from 1987 to 1990, is a reminder to the world of the mentality of a group that only believed in arms. India paid a huge price for raising terrorist groups in Sri Lanka. Just over a year after withdrawal of forces sent here to implement the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, the LTTE blew up Rajiv Gandhi. In between the Indian withdrawal and the Gandhi assassination,the LTTE chased the Muslims out of the Northern Province. That influenced a Norwegian manic to killed several dozens children in Noway years later.
Real post-war consensus can be achieved only if the Tamil community, and their representatives in Parliament, acknowledge the crimes perpetrated by the LTTE. Their insistence that the armed forces should be subjected to international legal mechanisms, while ignoring the atrocities perpetrated by the LTTE, made post-war national reconciliation impossible. That is the truth many refuse to acknowledge.
Years after the May 1991 assassination of Gandhi, LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham, a British national, in an interview with NDTV, declared: “As far as that event [Rajiv assassination] is concerned, I would say it is a great tragedy, a monumental historical tragedy for which we deeply regret and we call upon the government of India and the people of India to be magnanimous to put the past behind and to approach the ethnic question in a different perspective.”
This declaration was made in late June 2006 as Sri Lanka was preparing for the final onslaught. The assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in August 2025, the abortive bid to assassinate Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, in April 2006, and the Mavil-aru challenge three months later compelled President Mahinda Rajapaksa to take that monumental decision to eradicate the LTTE.
The LTTE was brought down to its knees in two years and 10 months (August 2006 to May 2009). The LTTE had the opportunity to accept surrender soon after the Anandapuram debacle, in the first week of April 2009. None of those jubilant over Nobel Peace Prize for Pillay dared to ask the LTTE to at least give up human shields and allow child soldiers to surrender. Geneva Human Rights chief Pillay herself failed to urge the LTTE to accept the ground situation. But to be fair to Pillay, Prabhakaran wouldn’t have surrendered as he remained confident of external intervention on his behalf, even at the last moment.
by Sasanka Perera (The writer is on X as @sasmester)
Diplomacy is as much about what is left unsaid as what is explicitly declared. A diplomat of an independent nation need not advocate a powerful neighbour’s regional hegemony in so many words to help legitimise it. The process can be more subtle: presenting that neighbour’s strategic ambitions as inherently beneficial, treating alternatives as outdated, and describing the expansion of its regional influence as a natural condition of stability and prosperity.
This is the concern raised in my mind by Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner to India Mahishini Colonne’s lecture, ‘Calm Waters, Rising Tide: Stability as the Foundation for Indian Ocean Growth’, delivered at New Delhi’s India International Centre on 10 July 2026. The speech presents a vision of regional cooperation built around maritime stability, economic connectivity and confidence and trust between neighbours. Much of it is reasonable.
The difficulty lies not in what is commonsensical in her declarations, but in the strategic assumptions that accompany them. That is not a domain of innocence. Colonne’s argument repeatedly presents India’s expanding regional role as an unqualified asset while giving insufficient consideration to the risks of dependence on a single dominant power, the legitimate security concerns of other Indian Ocean states, and Sri Lanka’s own historical commitment to preventing the militarization of the ocean around us. The result is a diplomatic narrative that risks confusing partnership with subservient accommodation and regional cooperation with meek acceptance of Indian hegemony.
An Obsolete Declaration or an Inconvenient Principle?
The speech’s most consequential passage concerns the 1971 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (IOZP – Resolution 2832 – XXVI). Leadership for the ratification of the declaration was provided by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the then Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. Colonne’s own ministry, then known as the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs coordinated the effort on behalf of Sri Lanka. Fifty-five years later, Colonne questions its continuing relevance, observing that it was a non-binding declaration that did not produce the intended outcome. She then asserts, “What must replace outdated instruments, therefore, is not another declaration. It is perhaps architecture. India is without a question its most important builder.”
It is a remarkable proposition for a senior Sri Lankan diplomat to advance without more careful and reflective examination of its implications. The 1971 declaration emerged from concerns that the Indian Ocean might become an arena for great-power military competition, foreign military installations and the strategic subordination of smaller states. Its underlying principle certainly was not that a particular legal instrument must remain permanently unchanged.
Interestingly, public observations by President Dissanayake and Foreign Minister Vijittha Herath pertaining to the complications arising from Iranian vessels near Sri Lankan waters have been articulated very much within the spirit of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace resolution, but with reference to the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Taken in this sense, Colonne’s assertions contradict that of our elected political leaders and the official policy of the government she represents.
As history has indicated to us, the declaration did not fully achieve its objectives. But the failure to realise an aspiration as in this case, does not necessarily invalidate the aspiration itself. The inability to prevent a war does not mean that peace was an unworthy objective. Likewise, the failure of the Zone of Peace initiative may reflect the resistance of powerful countries and the political limitations of the period rather than any fundamental lapse in its underlying principle.
Colonne’s treatment of this history risks conflating the failure of an instrument with the failure of an idea. More importantly, she does not adequately confront the question of why — in her opinion — the original concern might have become less relevant today. If anything, intensifying strategic competition, expanding military capabilities and the growing importance of maritime infrastructure make the prevention of great-power rivalry more urgent. There is, of course, a legitimate case for developing more effective regional institutions. UNCLOS provides a substantially more-developed legal framework for maritime rights and obligations than the Zone of Peace declaration. But UNCLOS and a political commitment to limiting militarization of the Indian Ocean address different questions. One cannot simply substitute one for the other in the same way a seemingly dysfunctional instrument cannot be replaced with the hegemony of a regionally powerful state.
The critical issue therefore is not whether the 1971 declaration should be reproduced today in precisely its original form. It is whether Sri Lanka should abandon its underlying objective and embrace a security system whose most important ‘builder’ — in Colonne’s formulation — is India. My sense is, in these observations, Colonne has veered considerably away from the official position maintained by successive Sri Lankan governments since 1971 and happily embraced that of her host government. While reading the text of Colonne’s lecture, I wondered many times if she had sought the approval of Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs before she publicly articulated a political position so fundamentally different from that of the Sri Lankan government and the ministry she reports to. This is indeed unbecoming and worrying behavior on the part of a senior Sri Lankan diplomat. But strangely, her speech has been published in full on Sri Lanka’s Foreign Ministry website, perhaps not understanding its implications.
Look at the practical considerations in this formulation. Would Pakistan regard an India-led security system as neutral? Would other regional nations, including those with close strategic or economic relationships with China such as Bangladesh and the Maldives, automatically consider it a common regional good? These questions cannot be dismissed merely by invoking the need for stability. A security system, which Colonne refers to as ‘architecture’ is never politically neutral. Its leadership, institutional rules, strategic priorities and distribution of influence and power matter. Replacing an imperfect commitment to regional peace with a system dominated by one regional power with its own pronounced vested interests could change the problem and drive it in a far worse direction rather than solve it.
Does India’s Leadership Guarantee Stability?
Colonne declares that “India’s sustained, present, principled engagement in the Indian Ocean Region is important, and there is no substitute for a neighbor who shows up.” This statement is unequivocal. It is also precisely where a Sri Lankan diplomatic perspective ought to exercise far greater caution. India is Sri Lanka’s closest large neighbour, a major economic partner and an important maritime actor. Its assistance during Sri Lanka’s 2022 economic crisis deserves recognition. Its disaster relief and humanitarian contributions in the face of the 2025 Ditwah Cyclone have also been invaluable. None of these facts, however, establish that India’s strategic engagement will invariably coincide with the interests of Sri Lanka or other Indian Ocean countries. It would be politically very naïve to assume so.
A country can be a valuable partner at specific moments without being an indispensable guarantor of regional order. Its interests can overlap with those of its neighbours in some circumstances and diverge radically in others. A mature and strategic foreign policy would acknowledge both possibilities. Moreover, when it comes to India’s national interests, it has never been known to compromise. This is something we need to learn from given that our diplomacy is often submissive and bereft of national interest.
Unfortunately, Colonne’s formulation presents India’s role as almost universally beneficial and as the only option available. The risks of overdependence, the possibility of conflicting strategic priorities and the concerns of states that might view an India-centric security system with apprehension receive no attention in her formulation. This is especially significant because the speech identifies the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as an increasingly important forward presence in the eastern Indian Ocean, referring to new facilities, extended airstrips and deepened jetties that India is constructing. These developments are strategically consequential, whatever the intentions behind them. They demonstrate the growing capacity of India to monitor and influence maritime activity across a vital regional corridor. What has been left unsaid are the potential consequences of this build-up which clearly add to the militarization of the Indian Ocean by a major regional player with its own regional strategic interests and relationships beyond the region. Colonne’s utterances do not address whether these would coincide with our own or other regional states’ interests.
Recognising these realities for what they are, does not mean hostility towards India. It necessitates, however, acknowledging that military capability and regional stability are not automatically synonymous. The expansion of one country’s strategic reach may reassure some states while generating uncertainty among others. Sri Lanka should therefore be interested in institutions that manage these competing perceptions, not merely in institutions or frameworks that strengthen the capabilities of the largest regional actor.
The Fisheries Question and the Limits of Diplomatic Trust
The speech places considerable emphasis on trust, describing it as one of the oldest lessons taught by the ocean. Colonne also observes that neighbors have a special responsibility towards one another and presents the Indian Ocean as a shared neighborhood. In a way, this is pushing forward two core elements of India’s foreign policy: Neighborhood First with regard to South Asia and the MAHASAGAR Vision when it comes to India’s expanded global maritime doctrine. Interestingly here, important Indian policy is being promoted by Sri Lanka’s chief diplomat in New Delhi.
The language used in this formulation sits uneasily alongside the unresolved fisheries dispute between India and Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan fishers, particularly in the Northern Province, have long raised concerns about incursions by Indian fishing vessels and the destructive effects of bottom trawling in Sri Lankan waters. The dispute involves livelihoods, marine ecosystems, resource depletion and the ability of Sri Lanka to exercise its rights in its maritime jurisdiction. Indian and Sri Lankan authorities have discussed the issue repeatedly. But its persistence exposes the limitations of naively invoking ‘neighborhood’ and ‘trust’ without confronting the practical obligations that make trust credible. The problem is not that every diplomatic speech must enumerate every bilateral disagreement. It is that an argument about shared responsibility and regional confidence becomes less convincing when a significant and longstanding grievance is entirely absent from the account of bilateral relations.
The notion of a shared neighborhood cannot mean that the interests of the larger neighbour take precedence over those of the smaller one. Nor should civilisational and geographic proximity or political friendship obscure the need for enforceable arrangements that protect Sri Lankan livelihoods and marine resources. A relationship is tested not only by the assistance provided during a crisis, but also by the willingness to resolve persistent disputes when the costs fall disproportionately on the weaker partner. Also, friendship today must be viewed historically and not through a lens of amnesia. Colonne’s lecture embraces a deafening silence on these issues.
Another striking omission in the speech is the absence of any substantive engagement with SAARC, despite its theoretical importance as a framework for South Asian cooperation and its current dysfunctionality. A question on why it is dysfunctional would have adequately answered some of the areas where Colonne is silent — such as hegemony. True, the organisation has been severely weakened by India-Pakistan antagonism and wider political divisions. But its dysfunction does not make the need for inclusive regional institutions disappear. On the contrary and rather importantly, the exclusion or marginalization of Pakistan from regional initiatives raises a fundamental question: can India-centric security or economic cooperation systems alone genuinely claim to represent the security and economic interests of the wider region if some of its constituent states remain outside it or view it with suspicion?
Colonne refers favourably to practical regional institutions and presents arrangements such as the Colombo Security Conclave as part of the emerging security framework. Such mechanisms may provide useful avenues for cooperation. But their effectiveness should not be confused with universal legitimacy. Their membership, mandate, transparency and relationship with wider multilateral institutions deserve far more careful scrutiny. Nor can China be ignored in these assessments. Its growing economic and strategic presence is an important dimension of Indian Ocean geopolitics. The competition between India and China creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities for smaller states, including Sri Lanka. An analysis of regional stability that foregrounds India’s strategic role without adequately examining the consequences of this competition is necessarily incomplete.
Sri Lanka should not be expected to endorse Chinese ambitions uncritically. But neither should it accept the proposition that the appropriate response to Chinese influence is to place itself more firmly within an India-led strategic alliance. The central challenge is to avoid becoming an arena for great-power rivalry in our own backyard, regardless of which power seeks the predominant role. That was one of the principal concerns underlying the Zone of Peace initiative, and it continues to remain pertinent.
Economic Integration and the Risk of Dependence
Colonne’s advocacy of closer economic integration is more persuasive than her treatment of security infrastructure. But it too raises related concerns which are left sufficiently unaddressed. India’s assistance during Sri Lanka’s economic crisis was important; and greater trade, investment, energy connectivity and infrastructure cooperation can benefit both countries. The High Commissioner is right to argue that a prosperous Sri Lanka should be regarded as an asset rather than a liability to India. However, the speech’s emphasis on Sri Lanka becoming a “reliable, stable, open node and hub” within the Indian Ocean’s emerging infrastructure invites a question: reliable to whom and on whose terms, and with what safeguards for independent decision-making? Colonne does not make any attempt to answer this obvious question.
Economic interdependence can generate shared prosperity for sure. But heavily concentrated and unmitigated dependence on a powerful neighbour without reciprocity in trade and investment, labour, travel and visa protocols, among others, can at the same time diminish bargaining power for the less powerful country. Energy connections, digital infrastructure, transport networks and investment arrangements create long-term relationships that may simultaneously constrain future policy choices if they are not negotiated transparently and carefully looked at from the point of view of national interest and diversified appropriately. This is not an argument against economic partnership with India. It is an argument for ensuring that economic considerations do not become synonymous with chronic dependence and political subservience. Sri Lanka’s interests are best served by maintaining productive relationships with India, China, Japan, ASEAN, Europe, the Gulf states and other nations, according to the opportunities and risks associated with each. Such diversification is not an expression of hostility towards India. It is an essential means of preserving autonomy and crafting international relations that best safeguard our interests.
To be clear, Colonne’s lecture is not an explicit manifesto for Indian hegemony. But when a senior professional Sri Lankan diplomat sustained by public funds delivers a speech in a foreign capital, she is not speaking on her own behalf. By default, she implicates the Sri Lankan government and each Sri Lankan citizen within what she expresses. This is why such public expressions which remain publicly accessible deserve the scrutiny of thinking citizens. The significance of Colonne’s speech lies in the assumptions that structure its core argument: that the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace declaration is outdated, that an alternative security architecture is necessary, that India is its most important builder, and that India’s regional engagement offers benefits for which there is no substitute.
Taken together, these propositions risk normalising a regional hierarchy in which Indian leadership is treated as the natural and sole foundation of stability, while the strategic concerns of smaller states become secondary considerations or simply nonexistent. Sri Lanka should reject neither India nor the opportunities offered by close bilateral relations with other nations. It should instead insist that cooperation be grounded in reciprocity, equality, transparent agreements, respect for sovereignty and a recognition that regional stability cannot be defined by one country alone.
The Indian Ocean’s future should not be reduced to a choice between Indian and Chinese predominance. Nor should the relative failure of an earlier peace initiative be used to dismiss the enduring principle that smaller states must not become pawns in great-power competition. Sri Lanka needs a foreign policy capable of acknowledging India’s importance without equating Indian interests with our own. It needs regional institutions that manage strategic competition rather than merely reorganising it under the leadership of a single power. And its diplomats should celebrate friendship while preserving the intellectual and political space to question the assumptions on which that friendship is built.
The most troubling aspect of Colonne’s speech is therefore not what it openly advocates, but what it leaves insufficiently examined. Hegemony is most easily normalised when the strategic preferences of the dominant power are presented as common sense, its leadership as indispensable, and alternative visions of regional order as relics of the past. For Sri Lanka, the choice is not between friendship with India or opposition to India. It is between a partnership grounded in sovereign equality and accommodation that gradually builds upon our own strategic autonomy. This is the fundamental but often overlooked difference between a shared ocean and a sphere of influence.
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