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JVP’s hidden ideology and post-election risk: Interview with Dayan Jayatilleka - Island.lk

Lanka Hit News • Sep 22, 2024 · 2y ago • 33 min read
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Sri Lanka stands at a historic crossroads as it approaches its ninth presidential election, scheduled for September 21. This moment carries profound implications for the nation’s political and social fabric. The election arrives in the wake of a tumultuous period where public outcry led to the ousting of the sitting president and the emergence of a new leader through constitutional maneuvering. Out of the 39 candidates, one has passed away, while those remaining vie for the top seat. Despite the previous elections being effectively two-horse races, three main contenders have emerged this time. In this climate of uncertainty and transformation, I met with one of the country’s leading political scientist, Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka—a scholar, diplomat, and thinker of considerable depth—to explore not only the intricate state of Sri Lankan politics but also the shifting tectonic plates of the global order.

Dr. Jayatilleka’s intellectual journey provides a compelling backdrop to this analysis. A first-class honours graduate in political science and a Fulbright Scholar, he has traversed the realms of radical ideology, academic rigour, and high-stakes diplomacy. His early engagement with radical politics, including his advocacy for Tamil militancy as a form of national liberation, reveals a thinker unafraid to confront the moral ambiguities of power and resistance. As Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, he played a strategic role in shielding the nation from international censure.

In the first part of this interview, we focused on the upcoming presidential elections and explored how the main contenders plan to change the country based on their promises and past actions.

Q. To begin, let’s focus on the presidential elections to be held on September 21. How do you perceive this election compared to the previous eight? President Wickremesinghe claims to have rescued the country from a deep quagmire, while Sajith Premadasa, whom you appear to support, argues that he seeks genuine legitimacy through a popular mandate. Why do you believe President Wickremesinghe may not be the right choice at this juncture? What makes Premadasa a more suitable candidate?

A: Sajith Premadasa is more of a (moderately) progressive Realist than either President Wickremesinghe or the JVP-NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake. He is a centrist who combines an excellent education; an upbringing with political, social and international exposure; a deep, second-generation concern for the poor and the needy; extensive experience in government and opposition, and a rare commitment to the combination of rapid economic growth and rapid socioeconomic equity. I think Sajith has a basically correct economic paradigm, and that’s the most important starting-point. He also leads a broad coalition, the Samagi Jana Sandhanaya, which has a number of highly competent and experienced former Ministers from centre-left administrations.

Ranil Wickremesinghe is the ultimate representative of the Old Guard, the ancient regime, who believes in continuity without change and a neoliberal economic policy. He is driving an agenda of total privatization and foreignization, i.e. the liquidation of the state sector of the economy.

Anura Dissanayake has little experience in Government and administration, is an utterly untested personality who explicitly condemns the last 76 years of Sri Lanka’s achievement since Independence in 1948 and promises complete ‘system change’ This reminds of either Boris Yeltsin who changed the system and caused Russia including Russia’s economy to collapse, and Cambodia’s Pol Pot who had a concept of Year Zero, because he condemned and rejected everything that had gone before. I regard Anura’s nihilism as dangerous to Sri Lanka.

Q. Anura Kumara Dissanayake is also expected to secure a significant portion of the vote. However, some pre-election analyses may be manipulatively biased and misleading, driven by ulterior motives, and tailored to influence specific segments of the electorate. If Dissanayake were to win, what would be the likely scenario for Sri Lankan society?

A: I think that there will be a flight of capital to start with. Anura and the JVP-NPP have some bright academics, mostly management economists, with them, but no one with either top-notch credentials or real-world experience. I do not see how Anura can successfully address the economic crisis. He doesn’t have the requisite theory, praxis, or partners/allies.

Q. I saw some political commentators arguing that what is happening in the country is a power shift from the elite class to the non-elite class. Some well-educated individuals also believe this. Having witnessed a series of internal conflicts within the JVP due to various reasons, including ideological differences, it is rare to see in-depth political views beyond the focus on popularity driven by manufactured hatred towards opponents, as seen with the NPP. Do you think that the JVP or its broader alliance has any projections for structural changes, similar to those observed in other countries, from Castro’s Cuba to Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo’s recent election victory in Mexico?

A: I have long urged the JVP-NPP (publicly and privately) to learn from the successful experiences of the Left in Latin America. I refer to Pink Tides 1 and 2. A hallmark of these waves was the pluri-party coalitional character of their project. A keyword was Frente Amplio or Broad Front. In its insular arrogance which dates back to its inception in 1965, the JVP-NPP has refused to study and incorporate the best practices of left success stories from Latin America to Nepal or even a state like Kerala.

Q. I recently spoke with a journalist from a Tamil daily who mentioned that during a meeting at Viyath Maga, a platform supporting Gotabaya Rajapaksa, you explicitly stated that Gotabaya was not the right choice and then promptly left the meeting. As we know, shortly afterwards President Rajapaksa was forced to leave the office and tendered his resignation from abroad. In my opinion, that was one of the most disgraceful events in Sri Lankan politics. Given your predictions at that time, if Sajith Premadasa does not win, what scenarios might unfold?

A: My first critique of Gotabaya and prediction of his failure was well before he was elected President. I did so in my regular column ‘At Variance’ in the Daily Mirror, in mid-2018, while slamming his much-applauded speech at the Viyath Maga -2 at Shangri-La the previous day. I focused on his economic doctrine and predicted the conflict that would ensure!

As for Anura, we have to understand that his party, the party he leads, the JVP, dominates the political movement he leads, the NPP. The JVP is led by its Politbureau and Central Committee, the complete composition of which we know nothing about. The highest decision-making body of the JVP is the party Congress. I don’t think even a well-informed journalist like you knows of the number of party Congresses in the JVP’s history; the last one and its dates; and the decisions of the last Congress. I certainly don’t.

This is vital because the party will be guided when in Government by the doctrine and decisions of its last Congress which its Central Committee and Politburo are pledged to uphold, as its party leader Anura Dissanayake. You cannot successfully operate a complex, vulnerable Open Economy inserted into the world economy, with such secretive ideological ‘software programming’.

The political structure of the JVP and the NPP which it dominates are in contradiction with the needs and requirements of decision-making and navigation of the open economy which is reeling from a debt crisis. At best, Sri Lanka under Anura and the NPP will be like it was under Dr NM Perera and the LSSP in 1970-1975. At worst we will be like Venezuela without the oil!

Q. Recent media reports and YouTube commentators have speculated about potential violence following the upcoming election, possibly leading to a state of emergency. This speculation echoes concerns similar to those experienced in India in 1975 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency amid political turmoil and unrest. Understanding the nature of political violence in the country, do you foresee a potential for such escalation in the future? If the situation worsens, what should be the response of political leaders and other responsible parties to prevent or address such a scenario?

A: The ideology that the JVP has inculcated in its cadre is different from its pronouncements on the public stage and TV talk shows. Nobody knows what that ideology is. The JVP’s refusal to repent over at least the murders of leftists during the 1980s is a bad sign. Even now, the JVP-NPP leaders sound as if they aren’t sure whether they are trying to win an election or win a revolution—the same ‘revolution’ they attempted in the 1980s, 35 years ago — through electoral methods.

It would have been much safer if the JVP-NPP had experienced democratic electoral partners and allies – like Dullas Alahapperuma—but as Anura delightedly admits, they “shut the door” on such a strategy. Therefore, I cannot rule out post-election turbulence stemming from their unpublished doctrines and ideology endorsed at their clandestine party Congress.

Q. Regardless of the election outcome, the new president will face significant challenges despite their promises. With the national debt exceeding USD 100 billion and essential services like education, health, and food facing budget cuts, how should the new leader begin addressing these issues?

A: As President Premadasa did in 1989, with an All-Parties Conference, in order to ascertain on what issues a broad national consensus can be arrived at and what that consensus can be.

Q. Considering the three main contenders, how do you foresee Sri Lanka’s situation in 2025 in terms of their leadership capabilities, foreign policy, and other critical areas?

A: If Sajith is the President we shall be fairly OK all-round. The economy will be managed relatively rationally, guided by Sajith’s cautious pragmatism; poverty will be reduced through time bound programs; foreign policy will need a little sorting out, but I think that the Parliamentary balance after an election will ensure that on economics, Constitutional change and international relations, Sajith’s SJB doesn’t stray too far from a middle path and the parameters of the national consensus sourced in the island’s ethos.

Q. Finally, following the presidential election, a parliamentary election will determine the composition of the new government with around 3,000 candidates vying for 225 seats. Given the current lack of traditional political parties and the rise of political alliances, what do you anticipate for the outlook of the new government?

A: I look forward keenly to the parliamentary election to produce a representative parliament which will serve as both support and counterweight, catalyst and corrective, to the newly elected President.

The second part of this interview will follow in another edition of the Sunday Island.

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The third NPP Budget offers something to everyone. But not in equal proportions. A budget for all seasons responding to multi-sectoral expectations. The expectations and responses are wide-ranging: economic stability, economic growth and external strengthening, bracing for economic headwinds caused by climate change and the Middle East instability, advancing social justice and welfare, significant infrastructure outlays, digital exuberance and enthusiastic embrace of post-industrial capitalism of the service, financial and information technology sectors of the economy. The sectoral responses are indicative of where the government is hitting the mark and whose mark it is.

The politics of the budget appears to be based on the government’s self-assurance that it can sustain its support among its core voting blocs in the 2024 elections: the southern formation of public and private sector workers, small businesses, farmers, fishers, urban poor and the rural population; plantation workers; and a proportionate share of the Tamil and Muslim voters.

The NPP cannot maintain the same level of support among these groups in a future election as it did in the 2024 parliamentary election. Its bet is that it can do better among them than any of its opposition rivals. At the same time, the sociopolitical contours are also changing and the budget’s vocabulary and allocations are reflective of these changes and the NPP’s pivoting around them.

The government seems to be operating with different sounding boards for different purposes – exposing corruption, law and order matters, legislative agenda, energy markets, educational reform, domestic economy, external sector, foreign policy and national reconciliation. What seems to be missing are ministerial leaderships in any or all of these portfolios with the occasional exception of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The task of governance is compensated by the overarching presence of an executive president with consummate communication skills and capacity for subject mastery. The government’s real strength is the weakness of the opposition with Sajith Premadasa being his own echo chamber.

The purpose of the budget, on the other hand, is to demonstrate that the NPP can manage the economy without ruining it. The reactions to the third budget would seem to indicate that the government’s demonstration effects are positive. The final proof will not come until everyone has had some taste of it. The business sector and growth economists seem reasonably pleased with the direction of the budget. The welfare advocates welcome the budget’s ameliorative initiatives but are not happy that they are too little to bridge the wide gaps between earnings and living costs for the vast majority of families, especially those outside the public service and its pensions.

There is also general support for the IMF association. Those who oppose the IMF route have suggested no viable alternative, even if such an alternative were to be found given Sri Lanka’s circumstances and constraints. The government appears to be leaning towards a new IMF agreement that will include “targeted social protection programmes.

Conventional thinking is that the government has managed to stabilize the economy with IMF’s prodding and that the new budget should be setting the stage for the economy to take off by facilitating investments and productivity. An interesting variation of this school has called on the government to address the many instances of wage-exploitation and official corruption at the working levels of the economy as opposed to its commanding heights. This last criticism is valid and the budget does not acknowledge or address it.

The government’s exclusively prosecutorial approach to exposing high level corruption and remanding highly placed notables, does not address floor level corruption in factories and offices that hurts ordinary people and are a drag on the economy. Specific to workers and their problems, the budget is remarkable not only for its silence but also for the total absence in the budget vocabulary of the old words such as jobs, minimum wage, workers’ rights and trade unions.

What is excluded is reflective of the lopsided status of union participation in the country. There are 2,000 registered unions but only 9.5% of workers are members of a union. Only 18% of industrial and service sectors are union members while there are higher membership levels on the plantations and in public service. In 2025, minimum wage was adjusted to Rs.30,000 a month, Rs.1,200 per day in 2025. There is no mention of it in the budget.

The vocabulary is equally remarkable for what it includes – digital exuberance and the embrace of post-industrial capitalism, including stock market induction for 18-year olds, as well as concessions and incentives to encourage investments in Data Centres. The NPP’s enthusiastic embrace of these sectors as a key plank of its economic platform speaks to the new social classes and strata that seem to be influencing the NPP to formulate current policy as opposed to the social classes on whose behalf the old JVP founded its politics.

The budget emphasizes the continuing weakness of the external sector and the strategic objective of strengthening it while maintaining the core fiscal stability that has been achieved. The budget’s target is to maintain capital investment at levels greater than 4% with an initial allocation of Rs. 2,000 billion (5% of GDP). The initiative is to be implemented by establishing a new Company, fully owned by the Treasury and run by experts and professionals from outside the government. A somewhat related initiative is the plan to open a National Single Window for Trade as a pilot project, to achieve co-ordination among exporters and between importers and re-exporters.

What is not clear is how these new agencies will be different from what the Board of Investment (BOI) is already doing and why it is necessary to duplicate it with new agencies. BOI handles both foreign and local investment proposals. The budget’s only reference to the BOI is in connection with the new initiative to provide 200% enhanced capital allowance for “BOI enterprises” that invest at least $3 million in export manufacturing within three years of approval, or tourism development within five years.

The budget is also silent about the operations of the BOI and the flow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) through it to the country. BOI’s website highlights the uptick in FDI inflow to the country under the NPP government after the drop in recent years. The FDI inflow hit the USD one billion mark in 2025, including both the expansion of existing ventures and proposals for new investment in almost equal proportions. A majority of them were in manufacturing (46%), followed by port development (26%), and the rest in tourism, telecommunication and development. Also in 2025, BOI’s export-oriented enterprises accounted for 59% of merchandise exports and 73% of industrial exports.

The budget includes a proposal for a feasibility study “to establish a knowledge and experience centre that expands links between industry and universities, promotes research and development, and supports the commercialization of new products and processes.” This idea is worth pursuing and could be started as a Task Force without a feasibility study and let it grow into something formal to provide a forum for co-ordinating export promotion and domestic production. But it would be wasteful and duplicative to have all four – the BOI, a company under the Treasury, a National Trade Window, and a knowledge centre – running around on the same track.

Sri Lanka’s chronic problem has been the inability to attract FDI at the requisite 3% to 4% GDP levels for significant impacts. Between 1970 and 2025, as the (World Bank) chart on this page shows, FDI inflow has exceeded 2% only once, reaching a maximum of 2.8% in 1998. Last year it was 1%, and 0.76% in 2024. Data covering 2024 shows that among Asian countries, Malaysia and Vietnam reached 4%, while Thailand and Philippines were over 2%. Sri Lanka had company in South Asia with Pakistan at 0.72% and Bangladesh at 0.28%.

As to who needs FDI for exports and who doesn’t is indicated by the vast gap between Hong Kong (30.8%) and Singapore (23.5%) at one end, and South Korea (0.69%) and Japan (0.45%) at the other end of the FDI spectrum. Sri Lanka is close to Japan and South Korea in FDI receipts but without their manufacturing assets.

One piece of data and discussion missing in the budget is employment and job creation. With the national employment at 8.2M, the unemployment rate is reasonably low at 4%. But the demography of unemployment should be disturbing. While only 1.4% of those older than 30 years are unemployed, for others between 15 and 30 years unemployment is at 30%. Graduate unemployment is 43%, the highest in Asia, and 18% of graduates between 25 and 29 are jobless. These are crosswires in a ticking bomb. More so because the projected job requirement over the next 10 years is one million jobs. At its current pace, the economy can produce only 300,00 of them.

According to BOI’s data, 14,000 new jobs were created by $507M FDI in the first six months of 2025. This translates to 27.6 jobs per $1M FDI. To achieve one million jobs, FDI inflow should be at an annual rate exceeding 3.5% GDP. For 700,000 jobs FDI inflow should be over 2%. That is either doubling or tripling the current rate. Not an easy task. While FDI is not going to be the sole solution, it an important part of the solution.

The somewhat unspoken elephant in the budget are Provincial Councils, with an allocation Rs 650 billion to Ministry of Public Administration, Provincial Councils and Local Government, and distributed among the different District Secretariats. There are also specific allocations to PC under other headings such as education, health, transport etc. But the political farce of running a Provincial Council system without a single Provincial Council is becoming all too tedious.

The allocations to physical and social infrastructure are routine and significant. But the problem has been slow implementation and low or non-utilization of the funds allocated in previous years. Hopefully, the budget debate will show whether the opposition is able to raise pertinent questions on budget allocations and spending, and whether the government has plausible answers or demonstrate its plans for efficient spending.

Deputy Minister of Finance Dr. Anil Jayantha Fernando has said that the government is considering the possibility of entering into another IMF programme. The previous government, headed by an unelected president, had entered into a bailout agreement with the IMF after defaulting on debt repayments in 2022. The present NPP government continued with the programme without attempting to renegotiate its terms, saying it was not the time to withdraw.

The programme achieved two main objectives. It enabled the government to negotiate debt restructuring with creditors, deferring repayments until 2028, and stabilise the economy, mainly through increased government revenue and reduced public expenditure. Donor confidence was restored, enabling the country to borrow further. After presenting its third Budget, which it claimed was transformative, presumably implying that the economy was on a sound footing, the government is nevertheless considering another IMF programme soon after the present one ends in 2027. This article examines the wisdom of such a move in the light of the IMF’s past performance and evidence of its failures.

First, let us examine the adverse effects of the present programme on Sri Lanka. Austerity measures have adversely affected the less affluent. The Government was required to maintain a primary budget surplus, targeting 2.3% of GDP, and restrict primary expenditure to control debt, thereby limiting public sector salary increases and capital spending. A wider tax base and higher VAT rates were introduced, raising tax revenue towards the target of around 15% of GDP. Fuel and electricity prices were shifted to market-based, cost-recovery pricing, contributing to higher prices of essential goods and services. Critics and trade unions argue that these conditions have doubled the cost of living, eroded real wages and strained ordinary citizens, farmers and small businesses. IMF officials, however, maintain that these measures are necessary to stabilise the economy, reverse the 2022 default and achieve long-term debt sustainability.

The government would do well to reconsider its intention to enter into future IMF programmes if it is serious about improving education and healthcare facilities, which are presently in a woeful state. The IMF’s insistence that countries prioritise debt repayment rather than seek a systemic solution to their debt problems is a major obstacle to spending on education and health. The IMF has never attempted to find a lasting solution to the debt crises that countries under its programmes invariably face. Sri Lanka had entered into 16 IMF programmes before the present one, yet ended up in a serious debt crisis in 2022.

Research into the outcomes of IMF programmes may throw more light on this matter. There is ample evidence that could be considered reliable, particularly comprehensive studies carried out in Africa, which has 50 years of experience with IMF programmes. Extensive academic research, data analysis and civil society reports provide substantial evidence of high non-completion rates, severe socioeconomic costs, and mixed or negative developmental outcomes associated with many IMF programmes (Rick Rowden, 2023). Data from the IMF Monitor Database covering 763 programmes between 1980 and 2015 show that 512 were interrupted, of which 291 never resumed. Research published through Taylor & Francis Online argues that structural adjustment policies and rapid spending cuts often exacerbate poverty, weaken public health systems and widen social inequalities rather than promote stable economic recovery. Despite decades of IMF interventions, many low- and middle-income countries remain trapped in severe debt cycles, with debt-service payments outstripping the funds available for public expenditure.

The enormity of Sri Lanka’s debt crisis becomes clear when one considers the interest paid on it. Between 40% and 50% of the government’s total budget goes towards interest payments. These, in turn, amount to between 50% and 80% of total government revenue. Pathetically, this is interest alone; repayment of capital is due to begin in 2028.

The IMF’s strategy in most bailout programmes comprises three main measures: facilitating borrowing, increasing government revenue and curtailing public expenditure. Each is beset by inherent problems. Incurring more and more debt could become an unbearable burden on the people. The cumulative effect of this was a major contributory factor to the economic crisis of 2022. Moreover, a large part of our production effort goes towards servicing debt. We cannot increase expenditure on education beyond 2% of GDP, despite a significant improvement in production. Educational infrastructure is woefully inadequate at all levels, apart from staff shortages. The health sector is no better. Brain drain, largely driven by economic woes, worsens the situation in both sectors. Education and health are vital to the country’s development, yet the IMF apparently turns a blind eye to these problems.

Increased government revenue is achieved through higher taxes and fuel and electricity prices. This indirectly raises the cost of essential goods, reducing real incomes. Wage increases to offset the rising cost of living would defeat the purpose of increasing government revenue and undermine the IMF strategy. Trade unions have already begun protesting against this state of affairs.

The IMF has adhered to this flawed strategy since its inception. It even accepts that developing countries lack the capacity to bear large debts, yet encourages and facilitates further borrowing. It knows that public spending cuts hurt the poor and undermine long-term goals in health and education, yet insists that governments refrain from adequate wage adjustments and controlling the prices of essentials.

The 16 previous IMF programmes did not take into account the country’s capacity to service large debts, the difficulty of earning dollars to pay huge interest bills or the actual needs of its people. Nor does the present programme. Our dollar-earning capacity has shown remarkable improvement in recent years, with exports, remittances and foreign direct investment all registering growth, rising from USD 7.8 billion in 2000 to USD 26.25 billion in 2025. However, all these sources of earnings are vulnerable to external shocks, including conflicts in the Middle East, tariff wars and global economic fluctuations. Any disruption could have disastrous consequences for our economy, possibly leading to another debt default by the time our debt obligations peak in 2028. Even if everything goes well, the fact remains that the poor may not benefit, while creditors would be smiling.

External uncertainty may be why the government is considering another IMF programme, which may appear to be the safest course at this juncture. Such a move, however, could be perilous for the living standards of the poor and lower-middle-income groups. They have borne the brunt of economic hardships caused by austerity measures and increased taxation under the present IMF programme. They may not be able to withstand another four years of harsh IMF policies.

The government would be well advised to explore alternatives to the IMF. For instance, it could move away from the Western hegemonic sphere, which, in fact, controls the IMF, and seek stronger relations with the developing countries. It could also explore projects aimed at import substitution in food and energy.

Poverty alleviation programmes could be developed on the philosophy that economic empowerment of the people would lead to human development, rather than relying solely on economic indicators such as GDP, inflation and foreign reserves, which have not translated into tangible benefits for the people since independence. Otherwise, the massive productive efforts of the poor would only enrich creditors, leaving workers in perpetual poverty.

One day during the Covid lockdown I pulled down a long woody vine entangled in the canopy of our jambu tree and began, almost idly, to play with it. Pressing and bending its unwieldy length between my hands, I found it surprisingly feisty. I interlaced it through itself, using its own resilience as counter-pressure to secure the loops. Through much negotiation, and with no sense of time passing, it settled into a large, orb-like form. It was hardly a masterpiece, more a sketch of an idea. But once it hung from a branch, its faceted outlines framed changing views of the garden as I walked around it: a transformation of material, space and perspective.

My training in Sogetsu ikebana has taught me to see possibilities in the unlikeliest of materials, and never to discount any of them. Founded in 1927, the school this year began marking its centenary, with events in Japan and around the world culminating in a grand demonstration in Tokyo in April 2027 by Akane Teshigahara, its fourth hereditary headmaster and the granddaughter of its founder, Sofu Teshigahara.

To eyes used to Western flower arrangements, a Japanese one can look very different. Some are disarmingly spare – a few branches, a leaf, a single flower – while others are full and expansive, their volumes kept airy by open, varied forms. But where a Western arrangement is traditionally based on principles of balanced symmetry, filling a bowl or tall vase with a unified grouping of harmonious colours, ikebana embraces asymmetry and works by taking away. It is closer to sculpture: a three-dimensional composition that works through suggestion, and through the interplay of line, mass, texture and carefully placed colour with empty space. “Ikebana is an art of space… a plentiful void projecting tension and power,” wrote Sofu in Kadensho, his Book of Flowers.

Arrangements began as offerings on temple altars and were later made chiefly for the tokonoma, an altar-like alcove. Set within the sublime emptiness of a tatami-mat room, the tokonoma was its quiet focal point: an ever-changing stage for a flower arrangement and a hanging scroll of calligraphy or ink painting, chosen to reflect the season or a special occasion. The alcove lay low, at the eye level of people seated on the tatami, and the ikebana was thus made to be seen mostly from the front. For centuries, the practice was governed by strict rules about which forms and materials could be used, and when. The tokonoma survives today in many traditional Japanese homes and buildings, from temples and teahouses to inns.

When Japan opened to the West in the Meiji era, after more than two centuries of near isolation, Western dress, customs and architecture swept the country. Ikebana, long the preserve of an elite of aristocrats, warriors and monks, reached a wider public and was introduced into girls’ schools as an essential accomplishment. Meanwhile, in westernised interiors and large-scale spaces such as department stores, an arrangement designed for the tokonoma looked forlorn. New schools of ikebana emerged, some striving to preserve tradition against the tide of Western influence, others to transform it.

Boldest of all was Sofu himself. Born in 1900 and trained from childhood by his father, a master in the classical tradition, he came of age just as these changes were reshaping Japan. With an artist’s instinct for what was coming, he sensed sooner than most that ikebana would have to adapt. He broke away from the set forms of the older schools to found Sogetsu. One of his greatest insights was to see ikebana as art in its own right, a “living sculpture” in which flowers were no longer essential, natural forms could be abstracted, and inert materials could play a part. He stretched the scale of ikebana from the intimate to the monumental, and greatly expanded the range of materials used, from driftwood and stone to scrap metal and even plastic.

Equally radical was his conviction, still the school’s credo, that ikebana can be made “anytime, anywhere, by anyone, with any material.” Without abandoning its roots, he carried it beyond the tokonoma, the temple altar and the tea ceremony, into modern homes and offices, public spaces and even the open air. He democratised the art, placing the individual’s freedom of expression at its heart, and made it part of contemporary life. That openness and adaptability ensured its endurance, and allowed it to travel across cultures and continents.

From the 1950s onwards, Sofu, dubbed “the Picasso of flowers” by Time magazine, played a leading role in carrying ikebana beyond Japan’s shores. He was helped by a movement few people realise was an American initiative. In 1956, barely a decade after the war, Ellen Gordon Allen, the wife of an American army officer in Tokyo, founded Ikebana International, an association uniting all schools under the motto “Friendship through Flowers.” When its American chapters first gathered, in Washington in 1962, Sofu, one of its honorary advisers, was the guest demonstrator. A Sogetsu manual in my own collection, written by him, appears to have been presented at that event.

Ikebana is a lifetime’s practice. It is passed down much as traditional music and dance are here, through something close to the guru–shishya tradition: a student studies under a teacher, and each teacher under a more senior one. Even the most experienced continue to take lessons, for the art keeps evolving and there is always more to learn. There are materials to master, techniques to refine and concepts to absorb, and above all an eye and a sensibility to develop.

In the early stages the lessons can feel confining and perplexing, especially in an age that prizes individualism and treats rule-breaking as a virtue or a badge of pride. Each exercise presents a set composition, specifying the proportions, angles and placements of the principal stems, and what must be avoided. Yet this foundation gradually hones your eye for space and relationships that a beginner, and even a more advanced practitioner, may not see. Only once you understand the reasons behind the rules can you break them with purpose.

The early lesson books, with their diagrams, can seem strange and daunting, but clear explanations and photographs guide you through each form. Putting them into practice is another matter. You must learn to handle materials that often refuse to obey you, and to secure a branch at exactly the angle you intend. You learn to judge which leaves to remove from a branch, cutting away those that interrupt the harmony and flow of the arrangement so as to accentuate a line or curve. There is a quiet elation, too, in puzzling out a difficult material or an unusual container, until instinct takes over from reason. Hardest of all, you learn to sacrifice a beautiful flower, branch or leaf that has transfixed you, for the sake of the whole. As Sofu wrote, “Simplicity is never a simple task.”

Elsewhere in Kadensho, Sofu wrote: “I was once asked what I would do if I lived in a desert where there were no flowers to arrange. I answered that I would arrange the earth.” The line resonated with me when I first read it, and it holds true here in Sri Lanka, where Sogetsu is by far the most widely practised school.

Tropical Sri Lanka presents its own challenges. Japanese ikebana grew out of four distinct seasons and its own landscape: the gnarled, twisting branches and fine needles of pine and cypress, shaped by harsh winters, and the slender budding branches of flowering fruit trees such as plum. Our plants grow lush and fast, with large leaves and straighter, softer branches. Here the struggle is restraint. It is hard to modulate volume and void with such abundance, and the more delicate forms of ikebana demand a different approach. But this is an art of subtraction rather than addition, and the tropics test that principle like nowhere else.

Ikebana also sharpens your awareness of nature’s cycles. We are blessed with generous sun all year and two extended monsoons, yet we have no winter or autumn. Instead, the seasons arrive condensed into briefer spans. In a single dry season the araliya passes through all four: its green leaves turn mottled shades of brown, sometimes almost overnight, then fall, leaving a bare skeleton of candelabra-like branches, until blossoms appear at their tips like flames. The art seeks to capture the ephemeral, and the tropics offer both extremes. The kadupul, or Queen of the Night, blooms for only a few hours after dark and has closed by morning, too fleeting to arrange. Yet the jungle creeper known as pus wela yields enormous seed pods, sometimes three feet long, that are prized by ikebanists.

Because ikebana uses living materials, you learn to listen to them. Some branches can be coaxed into curves; others will snap. Each plant grows according to its sun, soil and water, and leans by habit in a particular direction. You cannot defeat gravity, only work with it.

Arranging becomes a kind of meditative dance: you constantly step back from your work and walk around it to judge it clearly. Sometimes a piece takes two hours to complete; at other times the connection is so strong that everything comes together in minutes.

We ikebanists are scavengers at heart. I have a room at home devoted to my practice, brimming with materials gathered over the years: seed pods, dried palm flowers, twisted roots, branches set aside for some future arrangement. Its shelves are crowded with the vases and containers I continue to collect. At times it looks more like a storeroom, and would puzzle a stranger.

The lockdown forced many of us to slow down. Ikebana asks for that same stillness, but by choice. Sogetsu’s centenary theme – “To arrange. To live.” – plays on the Japanese verb ikeru, which means both. I understand it better each year. A hundred years after Sofu broke the rules with purpose, I am still learning the reasons behind them. And every so often, as with that vine from our jambu tree, a living thing shows me something new.

All photos are by or courtesy of the author unless otherwise noted.

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