Sri Lanka: Iran’s New Strategic Partner?
On 25 July 2011 Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei visited Bandar Abbas, Iran’s chief Persian Gulf port, to promote the role of both the Iranian Navy and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) corollary. “Both the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy and the Revolutionary Guards’ Navy are the symbols of the might of the Iranian nation in defending the interests of the country in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman,” he declared. [i] His comments might have seemed to be normal political rhetoric—politicians and even political ayatollahs often butter-up their audiences—but in this case there was something more. With the IRGC increasingly looking inward to defend against internal threats, Khamenei was emphasizing a new mission by which Iran’s regular and IRGC Navies would become a chief mechanism for Iran to project power.
Indeed, five months earlier Iranian warships made their first transit of the Suez Canal since the Islamic Revolution. [ii] The Suez transit became a repeating occurrence, and Iranian ships also began making regular port calls at Port Sudan, Sudan’s main Red Sea port. [iii] Both an Iranian warship’s passage through the Suez Canal and into the Mediterranean on 22 February 2011 and Iranian warships paying port calls in Sudan a year later have reinforced the fact that the Iranian Navy has expanded its operational reach.
Western officials have charted Iran’s increasing involvement eastward with alarm, especially as the IRGC has grown increasingly involved in Syria and Yemen. However, that is only half the story of Iran’s growing operational reach. In February 2013 Iran deployed its first naval flotilla to the Pacific Ocean since the tenth century. [iv] While the Iranian press focused on the ships’ arrival in the Chinese port of Zhangjiagang, near Shanghai, of equal importance was its port call in Colombo, Sri Lanka.
The island nation of Sri Lanka is strategically located in the Indian Ocean, approximately 2,500 miles as the crow flies from both Iran and China. At first glance, Sri Lanka might not seem a natural ally for the Islamic Republic. Its Muslim population numbers only 10 percent of its more than 22 million people, slightly fewer than the number of Hindus and far fewer than the 15.4 million Buddhists. [v]
The Islamic Republic, though, has never had any qualms about cultivating close strategic ties to non-Muslim countries. It has reached out to African countries serving as either nonpermanent members of the United Nations Security Council or members of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s board of governors, as well as countries with exploitable uranium reserves or port facilities which Iranian shipping might use. [vi] Iran also cultivates countries—even those like Russia which repress local Muslim populations—if Tehran can derive military benefit from the relationship. [vii]
Iranian outreach to Sri Lanka also takes advantage of Sri Lankan frustration with the West. Between 1983 and 2009 Sri Lankan forces fought a brutal civil war against the Tamil Tigers, who sought to create an independent Tamil state in the north and east of the island. The conflict resulted in the deaths of perhaps 100,000 fighters and civilians both, according to the United Nations. [viii] Throughout the years of civil war the United Nations, India, and various countries sought to facilitate peace talks. These largely broke down upon Tamil Tiger insincerity. [ix] Finally, after 26 years of fighting the Sri Lankan Army did what hundreds of diplomats and UN officials had tried but failed to do: end the conflict. Sri Lankan forces overran Ananthapuram and the Jaffna Peninsula and killed Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the Tamil Tigers. The final battles were bloody, however. Accusations of human rights abuses and summary executions swirled. [x] The UN Human Rights Council sought an investigation, a move supported by the U.S. State Department. [xi] The European Union followed suit. [xii]
As Sri Lanka felt embattled, if not betrayed by many Western countries, it was perhaps ripe for cultivation by Iran. After United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon agreed to appoint a special panel to investigate human rights violations by Sri Lanka during its final military drive to eradicate the Tamil Tigers, Iranian Minister of Transportation and Housing Ali Nikzad lambasted the UN panel, describing it as a “paper tiger” and a “pet of the Western nations.” He added that “if any organization or country takes action that will harm Sri Lanka, we [Iran] will always very strongly oppose such a move.” [xiii] Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki called his Sri Lankan counterpart to congratulate him and remind him that Iran had always supported Sri Lanka’s unity, implying that Western countries which sought a negotiated peace were willing to sacrifice Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity. [xiv]
More recently, Iranian Attorney General Ebrahim Raeesi visited Sri Lanka for consultations with his counterpart. According to his office’s website, during the meeting “he praised Sri Lanka’s recent efforts to block imperialist countries’ efforts to interfere in their affairs,” [xv] a statement meant to capitalize on Sri Lankan frustration about the United States, Europe, and the United Nation’s continued pursuit of human rights investigations into the conclusion of Sri Lanka’s multidecade terrorist conflict.
Perhaps one of the reasons why Iranian-Sri Lankan relations have seemingly accelerated so quickly has been the groundwork laid in the first decade of the millennium. Both countries issued numerous joint statements supporting nuclear nonproliferation, a boon to Iran’s diplomatic position, as it was depicting itself as a victim of cynical and predatory nuclear powers rather than a country in violation of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement. [xvi] “Ours is a friendship based on mutual trust and understanding,” then-Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottakki said, adding, “Iran is sincerely committed to the development of Sri Lanka, whom we consider to be a true friend.” In April 2008 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Colombo and declared that Iran and Sri Lanka both sought “justice and fair play in the world,” and pledged further cooperation. [xvii] Over subsequent months and years similar discussions occurred among other officials: Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and his Sri Lankan equivalent Wijesinghe Jayaweera Mudiyanselage Lokubandara and Mottaki and Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama , among others.[xviii] Certainly, such declarations of cooperation and strong ties are a staple of diplomatic rhetoric but, in the case of Tehran and Colombo’s developing friendship, there seems real substance to back the statements of Iranian leaders.
Consider military ties: as Iran began to project naval power more widely, it grew increasingly in need of logistical support. The Red Sea and Mediterranean are relatively narrow; no ship is ever more than a few hours from land and, regardless, Iran had long-term allies in the region, like Sudan and Syria. The Indian Ocean, however, is huge, and logistical options more limited. Iran and Pakistan may be neighbors, but, despite having more than 250 million people between the two countries, bilateral trade is little more than a quarter billion dollars. [xix] India might be a trading partner, but, with China looming, while India has welcomed an occasional Iranian port call in Mumbai in exchange for similar services for the Indian Navy in Bandar Abbas, India is loathe to antagonize the West by offering much more. [xx]
The first Iranian flotilla docked in Colombo in February 2013. Then, on 20 December Iran’s 28 th Naval Flotilla, comprising two warships, a submarine, and a combat helicopter, arrived in Colombo. [xxi] The Sri Lankan naval commander subsequently visited the Iranian submarine. [xxii] Rear Admiral Siavash Jareh explained that a goal of the deployment was “to show the Islamic Republic’s power and wave its flag in the southern hemisphere and to prepare for forthcoming operations to secure sea lanes in critical regions, especially the Strait of Malacca and Bay of Bengal.” [xxiii]
In 2015 Iran sent a destroyer and an auxiliary ship to Sri Lanka. [xxiv] “The presence of the flotilla of warships in Colombo port shows our good relations with Sri Lanka,” Colonel Ebrahim Rouhani, Iran’s defense attaché to Sri Lanka, said. [xxv] During the meeting Ahmadi Kermanshahi, the visiting Iranian commodore, offered to take the relationship to a new level by training Sri Lankan cadets in Iran. [xxvi] Iranian commanders and students also visited the Sri Lankan Naval College. Jayantha Perera, the Commander of Sri Lanka’s Navy, reportedly said that Sri Lanka’s relationship with Iran “is not just military but also political,” and said that the Iranian port visit at Colombo would strengthen the bilateral partnership. [xxvii]
Iranian officials, however, are seeking to expand the relationship beyond simply the military. When Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Sri Lanka was the first stop in his inaugural Asian tour. [xxviii]
There have always been low-level economic ties. Iran and Sri Lanka signed (but never implemented) a preferential trade accord in 2004. In 2007 Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa visited Iran and signed more than $1.5 billion worth of development projects. The following year Ahmadinejad visited Sri Lanka and inaugurated a $750 million project to upgrade Sri Lanka’s Sapugaskanda Petroleum Refinery, [xxix] the important of which lies in the fact that Iranian refinery servicing companies not only were dominated by the IRGC’s economic wing, but they were also, from a quality perspective, far behind European, American, and East Asian companies. That same year, the State Department expressed concern about the growing economic relationship between Colombo and Tehran. [xxx]
Outreach has been consistent. In November 2013, Sri Lankan Oil Minister Anura Priyadarshana told the island-nation’s Hiru News portal that “Sri Lanka will have a huge advantage as a result of relaxing Iran sanctions.” [xxxi] In 2014 Iranian Finance Minister Ali Taieb Nia met Sarath Amunugama, his Sri Lankan counterpart on the sidelines of World Bank and International Monetary Fund meetings to discuss accelerating growth of commercial ties. [xxxii] In the wake of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the lifting of sanctions, trade—especially in the energy sector—has taken off. Susil Premajayantha, a member of the Sri Lankan parliament (mistakenly referenced in the Iranian press as minister of oil), said that Sri Lanka favored Iran’s oil to that of Saudi Arabia. Iran’s Deputy Oil Minister Roknoddin Javadi suggested that Iran is prepared to provide 40,000-45,000 barrels per day, enough oil to supply Sri Lanka’s main oil refinery. [xxxiii] Both countries seem ready to update and reinvigorate a preferential trade agreement signed in 2004 but never ratified. [xxxiv]
In recent months economic relations have moved from the theoretical to the real. Sri Lankan tea exporters applauded the lifting of currency sanctions and hope Iran will return to its pre-sanctions status as Ceylon tea’s largest overseas market. [xxxv] In February 2016, for example, Iranian Energy Minister Hamid Chitchian visited Sri Lanka with an Iranian delegation to discuss not only partnerships with regard to electricity and water, but also greater cooperation among Iranian and Sri Lankan banks. [xxxvi] In 2016 Iran used some of its post-JCPOA hard currency windfall to lease Sri Lankan Airlines airplanes, effectively helping Sri Lanka’s national carrier to reduce its $1 billion debt. [xxxvii]
Iran also remains very cognizant of soft-power. An Iranian cultural delegation visiting Sri Lanka met with Ravi Jayawardena, Chairman of Sri Lanka’s Rupavahini Corporation, the country’s national television network, to discuss airing Iranian films and television shows on Sri Lankan media because of “similar cultural values.” [xxxviii] Sayyid Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, visited Sri Lanka in July 2016 to meet both political and religious officials. During his meeting with Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, the head of the Sri Lankan Catholic church reportedly praised Khomeini for “promoting human values.” [xxxix]
It is natural that with many international sanctions lifted, Iran would seek to expand its relations globally. While Iran continues to explore new commercial opportunities in Russia, China, Europe and—at least when it comes to Boeing—with the United States, Sri Lanka appears to be the subject of special focus inside Tehran. While international concern focuses on Iran’s activities in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, the growing Iranian outreach toward Sri Lanka appears to remain largely under the diplomatic radar. However, as Sri Lanka continues to feel unjustly criticized, if not besieged by Western diplomats, Iran appears willing to solidify its ties and, with it, Iran’s operational reach into the Indian Ocean basin.
[i] “Dawlat-e Mostaqal va Mellat-e Bidar-e Iran Har Ghodrate ra Majbur beh ‘Oghab Nashini Khahad Kard,” [The Independent and Vigilant Nation of Iran Will Force the Power’s Retreat], FardaNews , July 23, 2011. http://www.fardanews.com
[ii] “Iran Warships Passing through Suez,” PressTV , 24 February 2011, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail.fa/167955.html
[iii] “Iranian Fleet of Warships Dock in Sudanese Port,” Fars News Agency , October 29, 2012, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9107115704 ; “Iranian Warships Dock in Sudan’s Port,” Fars News Agency, December 8, 2012, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9107125136
[iv] “Navhaye Artesh Farda Varud Aqiyanus-e Aram Meshavand” [Tomorrow Navy Ships Will Enter Pacific],” Fars News Agency , 25 February 2013. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13911207000046
[v] “Sri Lanka,” CIA World Fact Book , 17 June 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html
[vi] Michael Rubin, “Africa: Iran’s Final Frontier,” Foreign Military Studies Office, Operational Environment Watch , April 2013, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201304/Special_Essay_01.html
[vii] Michael Rubin, “Iran-Russia Relations,” Foreign Military Studies Office, Operational Environment Watch , July 2016, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/current.pdf
[viii] “Up to 100,000 Killed in Sri Lanka’s Civil War: UN,” ABC Australia. 20 May 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/05/20/2576543.htm
[ix] See, for example, “Tamil Tigers ‘Violated Ceasefire’,” BBC News , 19 November 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4024827.stm
[x] “UN Report Highlights Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka and Urges Creation of Hybrid Court,” International Justice Resource Center, 22 September 2015, http://www.ijrcenter.org/2015/09/22/un-report-highlights-human-rights-violations-in-sri-lanka-and-urges-creation-of-hybrid-court/
[xi] Maria Otero, Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, “Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission in Sri Lanka,” U.S. Department of State, 13 February 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/184137.htm
[xii] See, for example, “Joint Press Release Following the 20th Meeting of the European Union – Sri Lanka Joint Commission,” European Union External Action, 19 July 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2016/160719_07_en.htm
[xiii] “’UNO, a Paper Tiger’ – Iranian Minister,” The Nation (Colombo, Sri Lanka), 27 June 2010, http://www.nation.lk/2010/06/27/news10.htm
[xiv] “Iran, Sir Lanka Vow To Deepen All-out Cooperation,” Iranian Students News Agency , 11 May 2009; “Iran Congratulates Sri Lanka On Defeat Of Tamil Tigers- Defense Website,” Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, 20 May 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090523161801/http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090519_11
[xv] “Safar-e Dadestani Kal Keshevar Jomhuri Islami Iran beh Sri Lanka” [Islamic Republic of Iran’s Attorney General’s Trip to Sri Lanka], Dadsetani.ir (Office of the Attorney General). 18 January 2015, http://www.dadsetani.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=3989&articleType=ArticleView&articleId=92312
[xvi] “Iran Willing to Share Nuclear Technology with Sri Lanka,” Fars News Agency , 7 August 2008, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8705170640
[xvii] “Sri Lanka and Iran Seek Justice and Fair Play,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sri Lanka, 29 April 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.lk/index.php/media/news-archive/1241-sri-lanka-and-iran-seek-justice-and-fair-play–iranian-president
[xviii] “Iran, Sir Lanka Vow To Deepen All-out Cooperation,” Iranian Students News Agency , 11 May 2009; “Iran Congratulates Sri Lanka On Defeat Of Tamil Tigers- Defense Website,” Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, 20 May 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090523161801/http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090519_11
[xix] Mehreen Zahra-Malik, “Pakistan, Iran Aim to Boost Trade to $5 Billion,” Reuters , 26 March 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-iran-idUSKCN0WS0F5 ; Saad Khalid, “A Statistical Look into Pakistan’s Foreign Friendships,” Express Tribune (Karachi, Pakistan), 3 May 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/880267/a-statistical-look-into-pakistans-foreign-friendships/
[xx] “Sri Lankan Navy Commander Visits Iran’s ‘Younus’ Submarine,” Fars News Agency , 25 December 2013, http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921004000902
[xxi] “Navgurieh-e Niru-ye Darya-ye Artesh dar Sri Lanka Pehlaw Gereft” [Artesh’s Navy’s Flotilla Docked in [Coast of] Sri Lanka], Iranian Students’ News Agency . 20 December 2013, http://www.isna.ir/news/92092919934/ناوگروه-نیروی-دریایی-ارتش-در-سریلانکا-پهلو-گرفت .
[xxii] “Sri Lankan Navy Commander Visits Iran’s ‘Younus’ Submarine.”
[xxiii] “Artesh’s Navy’s Flotilla Docked in [Coast of] Sri Lanka.”
[xxiv] “Iran Naval Flotilla Docks at Port of Colombo in Sri Lanka,” PressTV , 9 February 2015, http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2015/02/09/396835/Iran-naval-flotilla-docks-at-Sri-Lanka-port
[xxv] “Iranian Flotilla of Warships Cross Equator,” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting , 19 February 2015, http://english.irib.ir/subcontinent/top-stories/item/205016-iranian-flotilla-of-warships-cross-equator
[xxvi] “Commander: Iran’s Navy Ready to Train Sri Lankan Cadets,” [an incomplete citation]
[xxvii] “Maruri bar 3 Rooz Khazur Se o Someen Navgarueh-e Iran dar Sri Lanka ” [A Review on Iranian Navy’s Three Day Presence in Sri Lanka], Marine News . 15 February 2015. http://marinenews.ir/fa/news/20814/مروری-بر-3-روز-حضور-سی-و-سومین-ناوگروه-ایرانی-در-سریلانکا
[xxviii] S.D. Bhagya Sewwandi Dissanayake, “Evolution of Iran-Sri Lanka Relations and Its Impact on Sri Lanka,” University of Kelaniya, no date, http://www.academia.edu/15804847/EVOLUTION_OF_IRAN-_SRI_LANKA_RELATIONS_AND_ITS_IMPACT_ON_SRI_LANK
[xxx] Lydia Walker, “Sri Lanka and Iran: The 2030 Nuclear Power Plant and Iranian Support,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 11 February 2011.
[xxxi] “Sri Lanka also to Reap Benefits from Relaxing Iran Sanctions,” Hiru News (Colombo), 25 November 2013, http://www.hirunews.lk/72079/sri-lanka-also-to-reap-benefits-from-relaxing-iran-sanctions
[xxxii] “Amadgi Iran baraye Ara’eh Khodemat Feni va Mohandesi be Sri Lanka ” [Iran Is Prepared to Provide Technical and Engineering Services to Sri Lanka], Iranian Labour News Agency . 11 April 2014, http://www.ilna.ir/بخش-اقتصادی-4/158757-آمادگی-ایران-برای-ارائه-خدمات-فنی-مهندسی-به-سریلانکا.
[xxxiii] “Taiwan va Sri Lanka Mostari Naft-e Iran Shodand” [Taiwan and Sri Lanka Became Iran’s Oil Customers], Alef . 11 March 2016, http://alef.ir/vdcaauneu49nme1.k5k4.html?352382
[xxxiv] “Post-sanctions Iran Calls for Unprecedented Engagement with Sri Lanka,” Daily News (Colombo), 28 February 2016, http://www.dailynews.lk/?q=2016/02/28/business/post-sanctions-iran-calls-unprecedented-engagement-sri-lanka
[xxxv] “Sri Lanka Cheers End of Sanctions on Iran,” Colombo Gazette , 15 July 2015, http://colombogazette.com/2015/07/15/sri-lanka-cheers-end-of-sanctions-on-iran/
[xxxvi] “Tawse’ah Hamkari Mian Iran va Sri Lanka dar Zamineh Ab va Bargh” [Developments Cooperation Between Iran and Sri Lanka on Water and Electricity], Fars News Agency , 22 February 2016. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13941203000946 .
[xxxvii] “Debt-hit Sri Lanka Carrier to Lease Planes to Pakistan, Iran” Newsweek Pakistan , 22 July 2016, http://newsweekpakistan.com/debt-hit-sri-lanka-carrier-to-lease-planes-to-pakistan-iran/
[xxxviii] “Sri Lanka Khvastar Bakhesh Saryalha-ye Irani Shod” [Sri Lanka Requested to Play Iranian TV Shows], Asr-e Iran . 2 October 2015. http://www.asre-iranian.ir/fa/news/8745/سریلانکا-خواستار-پخش-سریالهای-ایرانی-شد
[xxxix] “’I Praise Imam Khomeini (RA)’: Sri Lankan Cardinal,” International Quran News Agency (Tehran), 20 July, 2016, http://iqna.ir/en/news/3460355/%E2%80%9Ci-praise-imam-khomeini-ra%E2%80%9D-sri-lankan-cardinal
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