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Last week, I received a registered letter with a bundle of forms informing me that an overseas parcel addressed to me had arrived but was being held by Customs. I immediately knew it was a journal containing one of my research articles. Hoping to avoid the usual trouble, I contacted a few Customs officials and explained how difficult it had been the last time I collected a parcel — that one was a text book I had authored and published by Springer Singapore/Netherlands. I asked if they could release this new parcel without me having to show up in person. Unfortunately, all my requests were in vain.
So once again, I had to make the journey in person — this time from Malabe — with an official vehicle and a driver who had to wait as I navigated the process. It took about an hour, which wasn’t too bad compared to my previous experience, but I couldn’t help thinking about those who might have to come all the way from Jaffna, Rajarata, or the East. The time, cost, and inconvenience involved are simply unnecessary.
What follows is my attempt to break down and analyze the outdated procedure we’re forced to follow to collect something as simple as a journal from abroad (see Figure 1).
This analysis examines the current procedure for releasing overseas parcels (e.g., journals) managed by the Postal Department and Customs. Based on the provided flowchart and user observations, the system is plagued by redundancies, inefficiencies, and outdated practices that significantly increase customer wait times and misuse available human resources.
The procedure illustrated involves four main counters and redundant bureaucratic loops, exacerbated by idle staff, poor workflow design, and unnecessary customer effort. Let’s examine each stage:
* START – Car Park: The process begins with a customer being turned away from an already full car park, followed by interaction with security personnel. No digital queue, no reservation system, and no customer support kiosk — all signs of a pre-digital era mindset. The unavailability of parking for legitimate customers signals poor planning.
* Counter No. 01 – Form Filling and issuing a token/number: The first counter requires manual form filling, often involving data that the Postal or Customs authorities already possess (e.g., tracking number, consignee name). This is an archaic duplication of information already available in the parcel’s digital record. Requiring customers to write this again shows a lack of data integration.
* Counter No. 02 – Custom Inspection and More Form Filling – Book entries (by them): After the first form, customers are sent to customs for physical inspection and yet another round of form filling. If physical inspection is needed, why is another form not integrated into the first? It’s a classic example of siloed operations—each unit guarding its turf, creating delays.
* Counter No. 03 – Cashier (Form Filling -Book entries + Payment): Another book entry by the cashier (accept only cash – no electronic payments) for Custom Clearing Fees (CCF), taxes or duties and handling charges, etc:
* Counter No. 04 – Parcel Release: Only after enduring all prior steps and queueing again does the customer receive the parcel. This could be the only necessary counter, provided that the earlier steps are digitised and synchronised.
This system is a relic — a functioning fossil of red tape. It does not serve the citizen, the environment, or the government’s own productivity goals. Its persistence suggests institutional inertia, lack of accountability, and fear of automation (Figure 2 and Table 1).
1. End All Redundant Form Filling: Develop a single, consolidated digital form that captures all necessary information at once. Implement accessible online before arrival or via self-service kiosks at the facility. Include form fields relevant to customs, payments, and parcel. Utilise dropdowns, auto-fill from national databases, and OCR scanning to simplify input. Store data securely with cloud backup and ensure compliance with data protection standards.
2. Digitize Inspection Records: Manual recording of inspection results leads to inconsistency, data loss, and time delays. Equip customs officers with tablet-based data entry systems for real-time logging of inspection results.
Technical Infrastructure: All terminals (inspection desks, cashier, parcel release points) should be connected via a secured intranet. Implement role-based access controls and password-protected logins to maintain data integrity. Audit trails and timestamps should be logged for every entry. Results should instantly sync to other stages of the process (e.g., payment terminal, release terminal).
3. Integrate Payment Systems: Manual payment with separate form-filling causes bottlenecks. Develop a QR-code or Parcel ID-based payment system.
Workflow: System auto-calculates duties and taxes based on the digitised inspection data and parcel information. Customers scan the QR code via a kiosk, mobile device, or present printed code. Payments made via mobile apps, online banking, or kiosks. Customs officers can review and approve online, and system issues a digital receipt that flows to the release terminal. Optional: integrate e-wallets or card payments on-site.
4. Streamline Staffing: 10–12 staff members are present, with several remaining idle due to inefficient task distribution. Conduct a workforce analysis and redeploy underutilised personnel to roles such as: Customer guidance assistants, Technical support for kiosks, Queue and flow management, Back-office data validation Benefits include improved efficiency, morale, and productivity. And enhanced customer satisfaction through better support services.
5. Allow Parcel Pre-Clearance: All parcels undergo inspection, including low-risk items such as journals or documents. Implement automated pre-clearance for specific low-risk categories.
Suggested Mechanism: Customers declare parcel type online during form-filling. System flags eligible parcels (e.g., books, documents, university transcripts) for automatic clearance. Bypasses manual inspection and proceeds directly to parcel release. Reduces congestion and prioritises resources for high-risk or dutiable goods.
These recommendations, when implemented together, create a leaner, faster, and tech-enabled parcel processing system that reduces customer waiting time, optimises resource use, and improves transparency and accountability.
This outdated model must evolve to align with modern standards of public service and technology. A well-designed digital workflow would save time, resources, and customer frustration, while enhancing service delivery and institutional credibility. This parcel release system is reminiscent of a pre-digital bureaucratic model that serves neither operational efficiency nor public satisfaction. Institutional resistance to modernisation and lack of accountability perpetuate these inefficiencies. As a final note, as demonstrated in Figure 3, we must look forward to;
* Eliminate redundant form-filling with a single digital entry point.
* Digitise customs inspection outcomes using tablets or terminals.
* Integrate a centralised payment system linked to parcel IDs.
* Introduce self-check-in kiosks or an online pre-clearance system.
* Reassign idle staff to meaningful support and customer-facing roles.
* Allow digital pre-clearance for document-type parcels such as journals
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT , Malabe. He is also the author of the “Doing Social Research and Publishing Results”, a Springer publication (Singapore), and “Samaja Gaveshakaya (in Sinhala). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution he works for. He can be contacted at [email protected] and www.researcher.com)
Jairam Ramesh’s ‘THE LIGHT OF ASIA: the poem that defined THE BUDDHA’ – III
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The government enjoys a two-thirds majority in Parliament and has a cohesive group of parliamentarians, making it difficult to challenge through parliamentary means. Its potential vulnerability lies elsewhere. Extra-parliamentary mobilisation could bring together political opponents, religious authorities and sections of the public in ways that parliamentary arithmetic alone cannot contain. Three proposed laws on the table, the legislation on Protecting the State from Terrorist Activities, the Prevention of Organised Crimes legislation, and the legislation on NGO Registration and Supervision are all directed at centralizing power in the state at the expense of the people’s rights and freedoms.
The unexpected challenge that the government had to face in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision to revoke the presidential pardon given to the well-known Buddhist monk Ven. Galagodaatte Gnanasara would come as a warning about the extra-parliamentary methods that might be used to undermine it. The episode demonstrated that even a government with an overwhelming parliamentary majority is not immune to political pressures that can arise outside Parliament. Leaders who initially attempted to resist the political demands of the Buddhist clergy have often found themselves compelled to retreat or accommodate them when the opposition became too difficult to withstand. This may be one important factor in the emergence of three pieces of legislation intended to strengthen the coercive powers of the state.
The disrobing of Ven. Gnanasara by prison authorities prior to coming before the judiciary became a matter canvassed at the highest levels of the Buddhist clergy. What began as a dispute over the monk’s robe rapidly escalated into demands for a presidential pardon, accompanied by calls for President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to resign if he refused to grant one. Opposition political parties mobilised behind these demands, organising public marches and demonstrations in support of the monk. The political use of Buddhism and Sinhalese nationalism has been a feature of Sri Lanka’s modern political history. Few politicians seeking to capture or retain political power have dared to confront this phenomenon head-on.
The experience of Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike is instructive. Having reached an agreement with Tamil leader S.J.V. Chelvanayakam in 1957 to address Tamil political grievances through regional councils and the devolution of certain powers, the prime minister came under intense opposition from Sinhala nationalist forces, including Buddhist monks. The protests contributed to his decision to abrogate the agreement. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s experience as both prime minister and president also illustrates the constraints under which political leaders have operated when attempting to advance reconciliation and power-sharing. His peace initiatives and efforts to negotiate a political settlement during his periods in office encountered determined opposition from Sinhala nationalist forces.
The government enjoys a two-thirds majority in Parliament and has a cohesive group of parliamentarians, making it difficult to challenge through parliamentary means. Its potential vulnerability lies elsewhere. Extra-parliamentary mobilisation could bring together political opponents, religious authorities and sections of the public in ways that parliamentary arithmetic alone cannot contain. Three proposed laws on the table, the legislation on Protecting the State from Terrorist Activities, the Prevention of Organised Crimes legislation, and the legislation on NGO Registration and Supervision are all directed at centralising power in the state at the expense of the people’s rights and freedoms. The government may believe that strengthening the powers available to the state will protect its democratic mandate against attempts to destabilise it through violence, organised criminal activity or other forms of extra-parliamentary pressure. There are reasons for a government to be concerned about these possibilities.
Sri Lanka has experienced political violence, terrorism and organised crime, while the mobilisation of communal sentiment has repeatedly undermined democratic institutions and efforts at national reconciliation. A government elected on a promise of system change has every reason to protect its mandate and ensure that the law is applied equally to all citizens. However, the means chosen to protect democracy can also undermine it. Laws that confer broad discretionary powers on the state may be used not only against those who engage in criminal activity but also against political opponents, peaceful protesters, civil society organisations and individuals who criticise the government. The distinction between protecting the state and protecting those who exercise power is crucial.
One area of particular vulnerability concerns the ethnic conflict that has plagued Sri Lanka since independence. It has divided the country’s people and, for a time, divided the country geographically, until it was reunited through military force. The end of the war did not resolve the underlying political grievances or remove the capacity of ethno-religious nationalism to generate hatred and fear. The government faces continuing pressure from the ethnic minority communities and the international community to make progress on controversial issues. These include the demilitarisation of the North and East, the return of land occupied by the military, whether legally or otherwise, and accountability for human rights violations, particularly during the war and at its conclusion. If these issues continue to be treated primarily as security concerns rather than as matters requiring political and institutional reform, the conditions that generated conflict will remain.
The government’s handling of the crisis surrounding Ven. Gnanasara offers an example of how such challenges might be addressed. It is noteworthy that the government has not compromised on the issue of a pardon to the convicted monk. At the same time, it compromised on the question of the robe, introducing rules under which members of the Buddhist clergy would not be disrobed without the authorisation of the relevant religious hierarchy. The dispute appears to have been brought to a peaceful conclusion through negotiations between the government and Buddhist monks, rather than through the use of the coercive power of the state. The government maintained its position on the judicial process while finding a way to resolve the immediate dispute through dialogue. This is the approach that the government may wish to pursue on other fronts if it is to achieve the system change for which it received such strong public support.
The government’s electoral mandate gives it an opportunity to address the problems that have weakened democratic governance, entrenched corruption and perpetuated ethnic divisions. The danger in the government passing the three proposed laws is that, once incorporated into the country’s legal framework, they may be used and abused by governments of different political persuasions. Even a government that introduces legislation with good intentions cannot guarantee how its successors will exercise the powers it creates. Nor can it assume that the institutions responsible for enforcing the law will always interpret those powers in ways that protect democratic freedoms. The Prevention of Terrorism Act provides a sobering precedent. Originally introduced as a temporary measure intended to remain in force for six months, it has endured for decades and remains part of Sri Lanka’s legal framework. Its history illustrates how exceptional powers, once granted to the state, can become entrenched even when the circumstances that originally justified them change. The promise that such powers will be exercised responsibly is not an adequate substitute for legal safeguards.
A government elected to transform the political system, and engage in system change, must be mindful that laws enacted to meet immediate political challenges can outlive the circumstances that prompted them. The ultimate test of system change is not simply whether a government can overcome its opponents. The real measure of its commitment to systemic change will be whether it can resist the temptation to acquire powers that it would not wish a future government to exercise against its own supporters. The government’s objective must not be to create a stronger state capable of suppressing dissent so that it can remain in power. Instead, the government must set its sights on bringing to being a more democratic and accountable state. The state that Sri Lanka needs is one that commands the confidence of all its citizens, protects their rights equally and provides peaceful means of addressing their differences.
The potential gains are substantial. Nepal and Bhutan possess enormous hydropower resources; India has enormous demand; Bangladesh’s energy needs are growing; Sri Lanka has considerable renewable-energy and shipping potential; and Pakistan faces serious energy challenges. A regional electricity market involving Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal has been estimated to offer capital-cost savings of about $17bn.
(Excerpts from the inaugural SAU-RCSS lecture delivered at the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, on 26 October, 2026)
The consequences extend far beyond diplomatic summits and trade statistics. Roads stop at borders. Railways remain disconnected. Customs systems fail to communicate effectively with each other, trucks encounter delays, energy grids remain insufficiently connected and restrictive visa arrangements impede business and professional travel. Tariffs, non-tariff barriers, investment restrictions and inadequate transport infrastructure compound the problem.
Signing a free trade agreement is not the same as creating free trade. A tariff reduction means little if a truck cannot cross a border efficiently. A market-access commitment means little if businesses face unpredictable regulations or investors cannot move capital with confidence.
Climate change makes cooperation still less optional. Rivers connect countries; the Himalayas feed major river systems, and the monsoon crosses borders. Floods, glacial melt, water scarcity, cyclones, air pollution, food insecurity and pandemics do not stop at customs posts. Regional cooperation is not merely an economic convenience; it is increasingly a developmental and security necessity. The recent disasters in Nepal were a reminder, if one is needed.
And then there is the all-important generational question. South Asia is home to one of the world’s largest concentrations of young people. Millions enter the labour market every year, in need of jobs, education, mobility, technology, investment and access to markets.
This is a double-edged sword. Get it right, and the region’s youth potential could vindicate the theory that a country must get rich before it gets old. Get it wrong, and a frustrated and radicalised youth population in a region of such extraordinary population density could spell very serious trouble. The first embers of that trouble are already visible in many, if not most, South Asian countries.
A regional economy could generate opportunities beyond the reach of individual national markets.
Yet the people with the most to gain from integration – the youth – have the least influence over the diplomatic decisions that prevent it.
Every cancelled summit reinforces the idea that regional cooperation is optional. Every border closure encourages businesses to look elsewhere. Every delayed agreement weakens confidence.
Gradually but, inevitably, the region thus normalises non-cooperation
. That may be SAARC’s most dangerous legacy: not simply failure, but normalised failure. People begin to assume that South Asian countries cannot cooperate, when the real problem is that their governments have repeatedly failed to give cooperation the political breathing space it needs.
Alternatives are useful, but not enough
The search for alternatives is understandable. BIMSTEC, bringing together Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, offers opportunities for cooperation. The South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) programme has also supported regional connectivity and development. Where SAARC is blocked, India and its neighbours may be compelled to pursue progress elsewhere. Smaller groups can move ahead on transport, energy, trade and infrastructure rather than waiting indefinitely for consensus among all eight members. Of course, this is without Pakistan’s participation
But there are limits to this approach. A South Asia integrated around everything except its two principal rivals would remain a partial solution. By passing Pakistan does not eliminate infrastructure bottlenecks, protectionism, weak institutions or political mistrust.
Nor can India integrate the region alone.
There is also the danger that a proliferation of regional arrangements could dissipate scarce administrative capacity while leaving the fundamental problem unresolved.
The more sensible approach is variable geometry: where all eight countries can cooperate. They should; where consensus is impossible, smaller groups should be allowed to move forward without abandoning the wider regional framework. Subregional initiatives should reinforce South Asian regionalism, not become permanent substitutes for it.
Nor should smaller countries be treated as spectators in a contest between New Delhi and Islamabad. Bangladesh has major stakes in regional connectivity; Nepal and Bhutan need market access and energy networks; Sri Lanka is an Indian Ocean trading and logistics centre; the Maldives depends heavily on connectivity, tourism and maritime links; Afghanistan, despite its Taliban trouble, plays excellent international cricket in truly border-less fashion, and has an interest in access to South Asian and Central Asian markets.
Genuine regionalism must give these countries a stronger institutional voice. Political equality must translate into meaningful economic participation and autonomy. ASEAN have done this judiciously and pragmatically. And they have prospered while SAARC has faltered. Pakistan and India, therefore, need to recalculate. In particular:
* Pakistan and India cannot continue to advocate regional cooperation while keeping economic relations with each other hostage to every political crisis,
* Pakistan’s security concerns and disputes, vis-a vis India, and Pakistan’s claim for sovereign equality, are real even if some of it may be debatable.
* But so are the costs of isolation which Pakistan needs to calculate. So, Pakistan can’t afford to overlook the need to address the cross-border terrorism issue squarely.
* Pakistan could potentially become a major transit economy connecting South Asia with Afghanistan and Central Asia.
* Economic cooperation and political disagreement need not always be mutually exclusive. There are many lessons from ASEAN, Africa, Latin America and even Europe.
SAARC cannot and does not need to become another ASEAN or European Union overnight. That is neither realistic nor necessary. It only needs to make cooperation routine and ‘normal’!
Tariffs must be reduced, but non-tariff barriers deserve even greater attention. Trucks, trains, ships and digital services must be able to cross borders more efficiently. Energy grids, without ‘killer switches,’ need to become genuinely interconnected. Predictable rules must encourage cross-border investment, while business and professional travel should become easier.
Institutional mechanisms must also allow projects that grow trade and value add, to continue even when bilateral relations deteriorate. Above all, economic cooperation should be protected from political disputes at least, wherever possible.
None of this will be easy. They need to be negotiated. Trustworthy pragmatism is the missing ingredient, and trust cannot be created through declarations and Summit final documents alone. Countries will hesitate to invest in regional infrastructure if political tensions can suddenly destroy the economic calculation. Businesses cannot build reliable supply chains if customs procedures can be disrupted politically. Smaller states will remain cautious if dependence on a dominant neighbour could become political leverage and the bigger neighbour demands ‘strategic loyalty’ and sovereign assets as kick-backs in return for economic partnership.
They must learn the ASEAN ‘art of the deal’ to depolticise economics and economise politics. Trust, in other words, is not sentimental. It is an economic variable.
Of course, only an incurable optimist would expect that India and Pakistan will not continue to disagree. But their governments must decide whether every disagreement should be allowed to obstruct the longer-term strategic interests of the wider region led by them. India must recognise that leadership in an asymmetric region involves costs and that these costs cannot be handled only through coercive bilateral means but be smartly defrayed through collective regionalism.
Pakistan must recognise that isolation carries costs of its own and their new-found outreach Westwards, including the ‘nuclear umbrella,’ is a tactical function of the current volatility in the Middle East and may not be a lasting starategic phenomenon. Both must accept that cooperation can be pursued without requiring political agreement on everything.
South Asia should welcome and support India’s rise as the world’s most populous country and largest democracy, with a young population, substantial purchasing power and a middle class comparable in size to, or even larger than, the entire US population. If a democratic India’s ascent is peaceful and rules-based, it is not a threat to be feared, but an opportunity to be seized.
India must reciprocate by offering to work with all in SAARC to convert asymmetries into mutually beneficial complementarities through negotiations based on sovereignty and strategic autonomy.
Yet India’s aspirations for global leadership in an emerging multipolar order, the clear contours of which are still suffering from birthing pangs, cannot be realised without the confidence and cooperation of its neighbours.
As Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr Jaishankar himself has cogently put, ‘India’s global standing is inseparable from its role in its neighbourhood’. If India is to be recognised as a ‘leading power and not a balancing power’, again EAM’s words, India must earn that recognition through, constructive rather than power-based, leadership credentials in the subregion.
It cannot expect regional acceptance while seeing South Asia solely through the prism of its geopolitical playbook. That is probably why some Indian analysts themselves describe, may be in partisan fashion, India’s ‘neighbourhood first policy as an euphemism for a neighbourhood lost.
New Delhi must, in particular, rethink the implicit assumption that India can do without SAARC, while SAARC cannot do without India. Such thinking is strategically flawed, even in terms of India’s own interests in assuming subregional leadership and playing a ‘Sherpa’ role. A regional platform for economic cooperation, representing nearly $67 billion in trade, cannot remain hostage indefinitely to the India–Pakistan impasse or to India’s unilateral calculations of its place in the emerging multipolar order.
Pakistan, too, must address the security and terrorism concerns obstructing progress through appropriate bilateral or plurilateral mechanisms. India, as the region’s pre-eminent power and potential economic ‘prime mover’, bears the greater responsibility for breaking the deadlock.
Within such a ‘neighbourly ecosystem’, all sides must—and can—move beyond mutual suspicion and strategic inertia to secure a fair deal for their respective taxpayers, without imposing unacceptable costs on their broader strategic and geopolitical aspirations.
Leadership is measured not by size or ambition alone but by the ability to build trust, common ground, regional institutions and turn national ascendancy into shared prosperity. After all, the raison d’être of smart diplomacy is to build common ground where none seems to exist. (Concluded)
(H.M.G.S. Palihakkara is a former Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lank
They may not be seen and heard, on a regular basis, on social media, but the group Mirage, with Donald Pieris at the helm, is very much alive, active, and absolutely rocking in the entertainment scene here in Colombo!
Every Thursday, they move into action at Jazzebel. Every Friday, they light up the Irish Pub. And when the weekend comes, the city knows — Mirage is in town!
What’s more, they are also in great demand overseas, and have performed abroad on several occasions. Their music has no passport it travels!
And now, Mirage is ready to zoom their way to Australia – this month.
They leave Colombo on the 12th of November and their first engagement is on the 14th, in Melbourne, followed by a sizzling gig in Adelaide on the 21st.
But the jewel in the crown — the big event that awaits them — is the farewell concert for the Australia-based group Replay-6, to be held in Melbourne, on 28th November.
Leader Donald: Pieris: “We are a LIVE band and we have always played live
This event has been described as a powerhouse of timeless tunes, closing the curtain on a legendary 50-year musical journey, and will also feature several other top artistes.
Mirage will be back in Colombo after their final performance on 29th November — which is a Christmas event, organised by the ever-popular Noeline Honter. Noeline will also be seen in action with Mirage when they perform in Melbourne and Adelaide — adding her own magic to the Mirage magic!
And the journey doesn’t stop there!
Their next overseas assignment is in the Seychelles – from 7th of December till the 10th of January, 2027.
Founded in 1989 by veteran drummer and vocalist Donald Peiris, Mirage is extremely popular in the Seychelles as well, and this would be their fourth trip to the beautiful islands!
Yes, this is a band that has done it all! Mirage has done the scene in Europe, performing in the club circuits of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.
What’s more, they became an overnight success in Dubai, being featured at the Novotel (later Marco Polo) scene for over a decade — something of a record in the Middle East! They played all the leading club circuits, and even participated in the Battle of the Bands in Dubai 2000, and Bahrain 2005 — placed second.
On their return to Colombo, they went into action at the Galadari Hotel, and became the talk of the town!
The current dynamic lineup that is ready to rock Australia:
Donald Pieris – drums/vocals; Toosha – keyboards/vocals; Danu – vocals; Gayan – guitar/vocals; Suraj – bass/vocals.
What makes Mirage so special, so timeless, so loved?
It’s simple. They are a LIVE band — no programming, no tricks, no backing tracks.
As Donald says emphatically, with that signature smile — “We have always played live.”
And that is why Mirage has survived, thrived, and continues to rock — from Colombo to Dubai, from Europe to Seychelles, and now — Australia!
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