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Back Kirsten, but don’t turn back the clock
By Siraj Perera, Dr Amrita de Soyza and Avanthi Jayatileke ✍️
Sri Lanka is entering a critical phase in its development journey. As the country seeks economic recovery through foreign investment, industrial expansion, renewable energy development and tourism growth, one important question remains largely unanswered: are Sri Lanka’s environmental institutions capable of managing this transformation?
Environmental protection is often portrayed as a constraint on economic development. In reality, modern environmental governance is one of the foundations of sustainable economic growth. Investors seek regulatory certainty. Communities seek protection from pollution and environmental harm. Governments seek development that improves living standards without degrading the natural resources upon which future prosperity depends.
Sri Lanka’s environmental laws are reasonably comprehensive on paper. The problem is not a lack of legislation. Rather, it is a system characterized by fragmented institutions, overlapping mandates, regulatory complexity, weak enforcement and insufficient accountability. If Sri Lanka is serious about becoming a modern, competitive and sustainable economy, reforming its environmental governance system must become a national priority.
Environmental reform is not simply an environmental issue. It is an economic, social and governance issue. Strong environmental institutions reduce regulatory uncertainty, attract responsible investment, improve public health, protect water resources, safeguard tourism assets and reduce the long-term costs associated with environmental degradation. Conversely, weak regulation often results in polluted waterways, unmanaged waste, declining biodiversity, land degradation and costly disputes between investors, regulators and affected communities.
Environmental Protection and Economic Growth Are Not Opposing Goals
This challenge is becoming increasingly important as Sri Lanka simultaneously pursues industrialization and a transition towards renewable energy. Solar, wind and other renewable energy sources are essential for reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels, improving energy security and addressing climate change. Yet renewable energy projects, like all major developments, can create significant environmental and social impacts if poorly planned or inadequately regulated.
Around the world, poorly designed infrastructure and energy projects have resulted in habitat destruction, biodiversity loss, community displacement and conflicts over land and water resources. Sri Lanka must avoid repeating these mistakes. Economic development and environmental protection should not be viewed as competing priorities. Sustainable development requires balancing economic growth with ecological preservation and social well being.
The country would benefit from adopting internationally recognized principles such as “No Net Loss” and “Net Gain” of biodiversity, which are increasingly embedded in environmental regulations and international financing standards worldwide. Under these approaches, unavoidable environmental damage caused by development must be offset through habitat restoration, conservation initiatives or biodiversity enhancement elsewhere. Similarly, greater use of cumulative impact assessments, strategic environmental assessments, climate resilience planning and meaningful community consultation would help ensure that development decisions are based on science and long-term national interests rather than short-term political or commercial considerations.
However, improving environmental outcomes requires more than adopting international best practice. It requires reforming the institutions responsible for implementing and enforcing environmental laws.
Four Reforms Needed for a Modern Environmental State
Sri Lanka’s environmental governance framework suffers from four fundamental weaknesses that must be addressed if the country is to grow its economy while at the same time protecting its citizens and the natural environment upon which they depend.
First, the country lacks a strong, centralized environmental regulator with sufficient authority to ensure consistent compliance monitoring and enforcement. Environmental laws are only as effective as the institutions responsible for implementing them. At present, more than 20 government agencies have the authority to approve Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), while numerous other organizations exercise oversight over environmental permits and licences. Although the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) is intended to provide overarching supervision, the system operates largely through fragmented institutional arrangements with limited coordination and information sharing.
This structure creates duplication, inefficiency and inconsistency. It disperses scarce environmental expertise across multiple organizations and creates opportunities for regulatory gaps, conflicting decisions and weak accountability. In some cases, concerns raised by one agency can be overlooked by another, while project proponents may exploit inconsistencies between institutions. The result is a regulatory system that often struggles to deliver either strong environmental protection or efficient decision-making.
Sri Lanka should consider consolidating environmental permitting and approval functions under a strengthened and independent Central Environmental Authority, while retaining formal mechanisms for specialized input from other agencies where necessary. A single lead regulator would improve consistency, accountability and transparency while simplifying environmental approvals for investors and developers.
It is worth noting that, under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, the environment is a concurrent and reserved list subject. This means it will be important to clearly define which functions can be devolved to Provincial Councils and which must remain with the CEA. The CEA should retain the central role of setting national standards and overseeing compliance, while Provincial Councils handle implementation at the local level. This is consistent with how environmental regulation operates in federal and quasi-federal systems — most notably the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and India’s Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC), both of which set national frameworks while delegating day-to-day regulatory functions to state or provincial bodies.
Simpler and More Transparent Regulation
Second, environmental regulations are often difficult to understand and navigate. Regulatory complexity imposes costs on both investors and regulators while creating confusion for the public. The environmental permitting system should be designed around the needs of its users, not around institutional convenience. Information regarding permitting requirements, approval pathways and compliance obligations should be presented through a clear and accessible framework that allows project proponents to understand their obligations quickly and efficiently.
Third, Sri Lanka has been slow to adopt modern digital technologies in environmental regulation. Around the world, environmental agencies increasingly use digital permitting systems, cloud-based monitoring platforms, remote sensing technologies, automated reporting tools and artificial intelligence-assisted compliance systems. These technologies improve efficiency, enhance transparency and allow regulators to focus limited resources on higher-risk activities.
Digital environmental governance should become a central pillar of environmental reform in Sri Lanka. Permit applications, environmental monitoring data, compliance reports and regulatory decisions should be accessible through integrated digital platforms. Such systems can significantly reduce administrative burdens, improve regulatory consistency and create transparent records that are more resistant to manipulation.
Monitoring, Compliance and Enforcement
Fourth, enforcement remains one of the weakest aspects of environmental governance. Environmental Impact Assessments often receive significant attention during project approval stages, but compliance monitoring is frequently inadequate. Conditions imposed during approvals are not always independently verified, and environmental violations often attract penalties that are too small to act as effective deterrents.
Environmental Impact Assessments should be treated as living documents that guide environmental performance throughout the life of a project. They should form the basis for ongoing monitoring, auditing and enforcement. Sri Lanka urgently requires a professional, independent and adequately resourced environmental compliance regime supported by regular audits, transparent reporting and meaningful enforcement powers. Environmental violations should attract penalties that genuinely deter non-compliance rather than becoming merely another cost of doing business.
Public participation must also play a greater role in environmental decision-making. Communities affected by major developments should have timely access to information and meaningful opportunities to raise concerns. Transparency improves decision-making, builds trust and reduces conflict. It is also one of the most effective safeguards against corruption.
Environmental Reform Is Economic Reform
Environmental reform should be viewed as an economic competitiveness reform. Investors are often less concerned about the existence of environmental regulations than about uncertainty, inconsistency and delay. A transparent, predictable and efficient regulatory system allows responsible investors to understand their obligations, obtain approvals within reasonable time frames and operate with confidence. Conversely, fragmented and opaque approval systems increase transaction costs, discourage investment and create opportunities for corruption.
The benefits of environmental reform extend beyond investment. Tourism remains one of Sri Lanka’s most important economic sectors, and the country’s competitive advantage lies in its extraordinary natural and cultural heritage. Few countries possess such a diverse combination of beaches, forests, wildlife, mountains, wetlands and ancient cultural sites within such a compact geographical area. Clean rivers, protected coastlines, healthy ecosystems and well-managed urban environments are not luxuries; they are economic assets that support jobs, livelihoods and national prosperity.
Institutional reform, however, should not be the final destination. Stronger regulations and better agencies matter — but the deepest guarantee of environmental protection is one enshrined in law at the highest level.
Towards Constitutional Environmental Rights
Sri Lanka should ultimately aspire to embed environmental rights within its Constitution. At present, the Constitution does not contain an explicit and enforceable right to a clean and healthy environment. Environmental protection is addressed primarily through legislation, regulations and judicial interpretation. While these mechanisms remain important, they leave environmental protection vulnerable to changing political priorities and institutional weaknesses.
Sri Lanka’s Constitution already enshrines a range of fundamental rights — including language, freedom of religion, access to justice and the right to education — recognizing that certain protections must be guaranteed to all citizens equally, regardless of economic or social circumstance. The right to live in a clean and healthy environment belongs in the same category. It is a basic condition of a dignified life, and as such, it deserves to be enshrined in the highest law of the land.
A constitutional environmental right would establish a clear national principle that every citizen is entitled to live in a safe, clean and ecologically sustainable environment. Such a provision could be incorporated within the Fundamental Rights Chapter and made enforceable through the courts. This would provide citizens with meaningful legal remedies when environmental harm threatens their health, well being or livelihoods.
Importantly, constitutional environmental rights are not anti-development. Rather, they require governments and regulators to properly balance economic development, environmental protection and the rights of affected communities. They provide a stronger legal foundation for protecting air quality, water resources, biodiversity and public health while promoting accountability in decision-making.
South Africa provides a useful example. The South African Constitution guarantees every person the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well being, and requires the state to take reasonable measures to protect the environment for present and future generations. These rights are enforceable through the courts and have helped strengthen environmental governance and accountability. The South African Constitution also recognizes related socio-economic rights including access to housing, healthcare and water, demonstrating how environmental quality is closely connected to human well being and sustainable development.
Sri Lanka need not replicate the South African model in its entirety. However, it is a model that demonstrates that environmental protection can be elevated from a policy objective to a constitutional commitment backed by enforceable rights and institutional accountability.
A Reform Agenda for Future Generations
The question facing Sri Lanka is not whether environmental protection and economic development can coexist. The evidence from around the world demonstrates that they must. The real challenge is whether Sri Lanka is prepared to modernize its environmental institutions, strengthen regulatory accountability and establish environmental stewardship as a core national value.
Reforming environmental governance, strengthening enforcement, embracing digital technologies and ultimately recognizing environmental rights within the Constitution would position Sri Lanka to achieve sustainable economic growth while safeguarding the natural assets upon which future generations depend.
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The government enjoys a two-thirds majority in Parliament and has a cohesive group of parliamentarians, making it difficult to challenge through parliamentary means. Its potential vulnerability lies elsewhere. Extra-parliamentary mobilisation could bring together political opponents, religious authorities and sections of the public in ways that parliamentary arithmetic alone cannot contain. Three proposed laws on the table, the legislation on Protecting the State from Terrorist Activities, the Prevention of Organised Crimes legislation, and the legislation on NGO Registration and Supervision are all directed at centralizing power in the state at the expense of the people’s rights and freedoms.
The unexpected challenge that the government had to face in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision to revoke the presidential pardon given to the well-known Buddhist monk Ven. Galagodaatte Gnanasara would come as a warning about the extra-parliamentary methods that might be used to undermine it. The episode demonstrated that even a government with an overwhelming parliamentary majority is not immune to political pressures that can arise outside Parliament. Leaders who initially attempted to resist the political demands of the Buddhist clergy have often found themselves compelled to retreat or accommodate them when the opposition became too difficult to withstand. This may be one important factor in the emergence of three pieces of legislation intended to strengthen the coercive powers of the state.
The disrobing of Ven. Gnanasara by prison authorities prior to coming before the judiciary became a matter canvassed at the highest levels of the Buddhist clergy. What began as a dispute over the monk’s robe rapidly escalated into demands for a presidential pardon, accompanied by calls for President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to resign if he refused to grant one. Opposition political parties mobilised behind these demands, organising public marches and demonstrations in support of the monk. The political use of Buddhism and Sinhalese nationalism has been a feature of Sri Lanka’s modern political history. Few politicians seeking to capture or retain political power have dared to confront this phenomenon head-on.
The experience of Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike is instructive. Having reached an agreement with Tamil leader S.J.V. Chelvanayakam in 1957 to address Tamil political grievances through regional councils and the devolution of certain powers, the prime minister came under intense opposition from Sinhala nationalist forces, including Buddhist monks. The protests contributed to his decision to abrogate the agreement. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s experience as both prime minister and president also illustrates the constraints under which political leaders have operated when attempting to advance reconciliation and power-sharing. His peace initiatives and efforts to negotiate a political settlement during his periods in office encountered determined opposition from Sinhala nationalist forces.
The government enjoys a two-thirds majority in Parliament and has a cohesive group of parliamentarians, making it difficult to challenge through parliamentary means. Its potential vulnerability lies elsewhere. Extra-parliamentary mobilisation could bring together political opponents, religious authorities and sections of the public in ways that parliamentary arithmetic alone cannot contain. Three proposed laws on the table, the legislation on Protecting the State from Terrorist Activities, the Prevention of Organised Crimes legislation, and the legislation on NGO Registration and Supervision are all directed at centralising power in the state at the expense of the people’s rights and freedoms. The government may believe that strengthening the powers available to the state will protect its democratic mandate against attempts to destabilise it through violence, organised criminal activity or other forms of extra-parliamentary pressure. There are reasons for a government to be concerned about these possibilities.
Sri Lanka has experienced political violence, terrorism and organised crime, while the mobilisation of communal sentiment has repeatedly undermined democratic institutions and efforts at national reconciliation. A government elected on a promise of system change has every reason to protect its mandate and ensure that the law is applied equally to all citizens. However, the means chosen to protect democracy can also undermine it. Laws that confer broad discretionary powers on the state may be used not only against those who engage in criminal activity but also against political opponents, peaceful protesters, civil society organisations and individuals who criticise the government. The distinction between protecting the state and protecting those who exercise power is crucial.
One area of particular vulnerability concerns the ethnic conflict that has plagued Sri Lanka since independence. It has divided the country’s people and, for a time, divided the country geographically, until it was reunited through military force. The end of the war did not resolve the underlying political grievances or remove the capacity of ethno-religious nationalism to generate hatred and fear. The government faces continuing pressure from the ethnic minority communities and the international community to make progress on controversial issues. These include the demilitarisation of the North and East, the return of land occupied by the military, whether legally or otherwise, and accountability for human rights violations, particularly during the war and at its conclusion. If these issues continue to be treated primarily as security concerns rather than as matters requiring political and institutional reform, the conditions that generated conflict will remain.
The government’s handling of the crisis surrounding Ven. Gnanasara offers an example of how such challenges might be addressed. It is noteworthy that the government has not compromised on the issue of a pardon to the convicted monk. At the same time, it compromised on the question of the robe, introducing rules under which members of the Buddhist clergy would not be disrobed without the authorisation of the relevant religious hierarchy. The dispute appears to have been brought to a peaceful conclusion through negotiations between the government and Buddhist monks, rather than through the use of the coercive power of the state. The government maintained its position on the judicial process while finding a way to resolve the immediate dispute through dialogue. This is the approach that the government may wish to pursue on other fronts if it is to achieve the system change for which it received such strong public support.
The government’s electoral mandate gives it an opportunity to address the problems that have weakened democratic governance, entrenched corruption and perpetuated ethnic divisions. The danger in the government passing the three proposed laws is that, once incorporated into the country’s legal framework, they may be used and abused by governments of different political persuasions. Even a government that introduces legislation with good intentions cannot guarantee how its successors will exercise the powers it creates. Nor can it assume that the institutions responsible for enforcing the law will always interpret those powers in ways that protect democratic freedoms. The Prevention of Terrorism Act provides a sobering precedent. Originally introduced as a temporary measure intended to remain in force for six months, it has endured for decades and remains part of Sri Lanka’s legal framework. Its history illustrates how exceptional powers, once granted to the state, can become entrenched even when the circumstances that originally justified them change. The promise that such powers will be exercised responsibly is not an adequate substitute for legal safeguards.
A government elected to transform the political system, and engage in system change, must be mindful that laws enacted to meet immediate political challenges can outlive the circumstances that prompted them. The ultimate test of system change is not simply whether a government can overcome its opponents. The real measure of its commitment to systemic change will be whether it can resist the temptation to acquire powers that it would not wish a future government to exercise against its own supporters. The government’s objective must not be to create a stronger state capable of suppressing dissent so that it can remain in power. Instead, the government must set its sights on bringing to being a more democratic and accountable state. The state that Sri Lanka needs is one that commands the confidence of all its citizens, protects their rights equally and provides peaceful means of addressing their differences.
The potential gains are substantial. Nepal and Bhutan possess enormous hydropower resources; India has enormous demand; Bangladesh’s energy needs are growing; Sri Lanka has considerable renewable-energy and shipping potential; and Pakistan faces serious energy challenges. A regional electricity market involving Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal has been estimated to offer capital-cost savings of about $17bn.
(Excerpts from the inaugural SAU-RCSS lecture delivered at the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, on 26 October, 2026)
The consequences extend far beyond diplomatic summits and trade statistics. Roads stop at borders. Railways remain disconnected. Customs systems fail to communicate effectively with each other, trucks encounter delays, energy grids remain insufficiently connected and restrictive visa arrangements impede business and professional travel. Tariffs, non-tariff barriers, investment restrictions and inadequate transport infrastructure compound the problem.
Signing a free trade agreement is not the same as creating free trade. A tariff reduction means little if a truck cannot cross a border efficiently. A market-access commitment means little if businesses face unpredictable regulations or investors cannot move capital with confidence.
Climate change makes cooperation still less optional. Rivers connect countries; the Himalayas feed major river systems, and the monsoon crosses borders. Floods, glacial melt, water scarcity, cyclones, air pollution, food insecurity and pandemics do not stop at customs posts. Regional cooperation is not merely an economic convenience; it is increasingly a developmental and security necessity. The recent disasters in Nepal were a reminder, if one is needed.
And then there is the all-important generational question. South Asia is home to one of the world’s largest concentrations of young people. Millions enter the labour market every year, in need of jobs, education, mobility, technology, investment and access to markets.
This is a double-edged sword. Get it right, and the region’s youth potential could vindicate the theory that a country must get rich before it gets old. Get it wrong, and a frustrated and radicalised youth population in a region of such extraordinary population density could spell very serious trouble. The first embers of that trouble are already visible in many, if not most, South Asian countries.
A regional economy could generate opportunities beyond the reach of individual national markets.
Yet the people with the most to gain from integration – the youth – have the least influence over the diplomatic decisions that prevent it.
Every cancelled summit reinforces the idea that regional cooperation is optional. Every border closure encourages businesses to look elsewhere. Every delayed agreement weakens confidence.
Gradually but, inevitably, the region thus normalises non-cooperation
. That may be SAARC’s most dangerous legacy: not simply failure, but normalised failure. People begin to assume that South Asian countries cannot cooperate, when the real problem is that their governments have repeatedly failed to give cooperation the political breathing space it needs.
Alternatives are useful, but not enough
The search for alternatives is understandable. BIMSTEC, bringing together Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, offers opportunities for cooperation. The South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) programme has also supported regional connectivity and development. Where SAARC is blocked, India and its neighbours may be compelled to pursue progress elsewhere. Smaller groups can move ahead on transport, energy, trade and infrastructure rather than waiting indefinitely for consensus among all eight members. Of course, this is without Pakistan’s participation
But there are limits to this approach. A South Asia integrated around everything except its two principal rivals would remain a partial solution. By passing Pakistan does not eliminate infrastructure bottlenecks, protectionism, weak institutions or political mistrust.
Nor can India integrate the region alone.
There is also the danger that a proliferation of regional arrangements could dissipate scarce administrative capacity while leaving the fundamental problem unresolved.
The more sensible approach is variable geometry: where all eight countries can cooperate. They should; where consensus is impossible, smaller groups should be allowed to move forward without abandoning the wider regional framework. Subregional initiatives should reinforce South Asian regionalism, not become permanent substitutes for it.
Nor should smaller countries be treated as spectators in a contest between New Delhi and Islamabad. Bangladesh has major stakes in regional connectivity; Nepal and Bhutan need market access and energy networks; Sri Lanka is an Indian Ocean trading and logistics centre; the Maldives depends heavily on connectivity, tourism and maritime links; Afghanistan, despite its Taliban trouble, plays excellent international cricket in truly border-less fashion, and has an interest in access to South Asian and Central Asian markets.
Genuine regionalism must give these countries a stronger institutional voice. Political equality must translate into meaningful economic participation and autonomy. ASEAN have done this judiciously and pragmatically. And they have prospered while SAARC has faltered. Pakistan and India, therefore, need to recalculate. In particular:
* Pakistan and India cannot continue to advocate regional cooperation while keeping economic relations with each other hostage to every political crisis,
* Pakistan’s security concerns and disputes, vis-a vis India, and Pakistan’s claim for sovereign equality, are real even if some of it may be debatable.
* But so are the costs of isolation which Pakistan needs to calculate. So, Pakistan can’t afford to overlook the need to address the cross-border terrorism issue squarely.
* Pakistan could potentially become a major transit economy connecting South Asia with Afghanistan and Central Asia.
* Economic cooperation and political disagreement need not always be mutually exclusive. There are many lessons from ASEAN, Africa, Latin America and even Europe.
SAARC cannot and does not need to become another ASEAN or European Union overnight. That is neither realistic nor necessary. It only needs to make cooperation routine and ‘normal’!
Tariffs must be reduced, but non-tariff barriers deserve even greater attention. Trucks, trains, ships and digital services must be able to cross borders more efficiently. Energy grids, without ‘killer switches,’ need to become genuinely interconnected. Predictable rules must encourage cross-border investment, while business and professional travel should become easier.
Institutional mechanisms must also allow projects that grow trade and value add, to continue even when bilateral relations deteriorate. Above all, economic cooperation should be protected from political disputes at least, wherever possible.
None of this will be easy. They need to be negotiated. Trustworthy pragmatism is the missing ingredient, and trust cannot be created through declarations and Summit final documents alone. Countries will hesitate to invest in regional infrastructure if political tensions can suddenly destroy the economic calculation. Businesses cannot build reliable supply chains if customs procedures can be disrupted politically. Smaller states will remain cautious if dependence on a dominant neighbour could become political leverage and the bigger neighbour demands ‘strategic loyalty’ and sovereign assets as kick-backs in return for economic partnership.
They must learn the ASEAN ‘art of the deal’ to depolticise economics and economise politics. Trust, in other words, is not sentimental. It is an economic variable.
Of course, only an incurable optimist would expect that India and Pakistan will not continue to disagree. But their governments must decide whether every disagreement should be allowed to obstruct the longer-term strategic interests of the wider region led by them. India must recognise that leadership in an asymmetric region involves costs and that these costs cannot be handled only through coercive bilateral means but be smartly defrayed through collective regionalism.
Pakistan must recognise that isolation carries costs of its own and their new-found outreach Westwards, including the ‘nuclear umbrella,’ is a tactical function of the current volatility in the Middle East and may not be a lasting starategic phenomenon. Both must accept that cooperation can be pursued without requiring political agreement on everything.
South Asia should welcome and support India’s rise as the world’s most populous country and largest democracy, with a young population, substantial purchasing power and a middle class comparable in size to, or even larger than, the entire US population. If a democratic India’s ascent is peaceful and rules-based, it is not a threat to be feared, but an opportunity to be seized.
India must reciprocate by offering to work with all in SAARC to convert asymmetries into mutually beneficial complementarities through negotiations based on sovereignty and strategic autonomy.
Yet India’s aspirations for global leadership in an emerging multipolar order, the clear contours of which are still suffering from birthing pangs, cannot be realised without the confidence and cooperation of its neighbours.
As Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr Jaishankar himself has cogently put, ‘India’s global standing is inseparable from its role in its neighbourhood’. If India is to be recognised as a ‘leading power and not a balancing power’, again EAM’s words, India must earn that recognition through, constructive rather than power-based, leadership credentials in the subregion.
It cannot expect regional acceptance while seeing South Asia solely through the prism of its geopolitical playbook. That is probably why some Indian analysts themselves describe, may be in partisan fashion, India’s ‘neighbourhood first policy as an euphemism for a neighbourhood lost.
New Delhi must, in particular, rethink the implicit assumption that India can do without SAARC, while SAARC cannot do without India. Such thinking is strategically flawed, even in terms of India’s own interests in assuming subregional leadership and playing a ‘Sherpa’ role. A regional platform for economic cooperation, representing nearly $67 billion in trade, cannot remain hostage indefinitely to the India–Pakistan impasse or to India’s unilateral calculations of its place in the emerging multipolar order.
Pakistan, too, must address the security and terrorism concerns obstructing progress through appropriate bilateral or plurilateral mechanisms. India, as the region’s pre-eminent power and potential economic ‘prime mover’, bears the greater responsibility for breaking the deadlock.
Within such a ‘neighbourly ecosystem’, all sides must—and can—move beyond mutual suspicion and strategic inertia to secure a fair deal for their respective taxpayers, without imposing unacceptable costs on their broader strategic and geopolitical aspirations.
Leadership is measured not by size or ambition alone but by the ability to build trust, common ground, regional institutions and turn national ascendancy into shared prosperity. After all, the raison d’être of smart diplomacy is to build common ground where none seems to exist. (Concluded)
(H.M.G.S. Palihakkara is a former Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lank
They may not be seen and heard, on a regular basis, on social media, but the group Mirage, with Donald Pieris at the helm, is very much alive, active, and absolutely rocking in the entertainment scene here in Colombo!
Every Thursday, they move into action at Jazzebel. Every Friday, they light up the Irish Pub. And when the weekend comes, the city knows — Mirage is in town!
What’s more, they are also in great demand overseas, and have performed abroad on several occasions. Their music has no passport it travels!
And now, Mirage is ready to zoom their way to Australia – this month.
They leave Colombo on the 12th of November and their first engagement is on the 14th, in Melbourne, followed by a sizzling gig in Adelaide on the 21st.
But the jewel in the crown — the big event that awaits them — is the farewell concert for the Australia-based group Replay-6, to be held in Melbourne, on 28th November.
Leader Donald: Pieris: “We are a LIVE band and we have always played live
This event has been described as a powerhouse of timeless tunes, closing the curtain on a legendary 50-year musical journey, and will also feature several other top artistes.
Mirage will be back in Colombo after their final performance on 29th November — which is a Christmas event, organised by the ever-popular Noeline Honter. Noeline will also be seen in action with Mirage when they perform in Melbourne and Adelaide — adding her own magic to the Mirage magic!
And the journey doesn’t stop there!
Their next overseas assignment is in the Seychelles – from 7th of December till the 10th of January, 2027.
Founded in 1989 by veteran drummer and vocalist Donald Peiris, Mirage is extremely popular in the Seychelles as well, and this would be their fourth trip to the beautiful islands!
Yes, this is a band that has done it all! Mirage has done the scene in Europe, performing in the club circuits of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.
What’s more, they became an overnight success in Dubai, being featured at the Novotel (later Marco Polo) scene for over a decade — something of a record in the Middle East! They played all the leading club circuits, and even participated in the Battle of the Bands in Dubai 2000, and Bahrain 2005 — placed second.
On their return to Colombo, they went into action at the Galadari Hotel, and became the talk of the town!
The current dynamic lineup that is ready to rock Australia:
Donald Pieris – drums/vocals; Toosha – keyboards/vocals; Danu – vocals; Gayan – guitar/vocals; Suraj – bass/vocals.
What makes Mirage so special, so timeless, so loved?
It’s simple. They are a LIVE band — no programming, no tricks, no backing tracks.
As Donald says emphatically, with that signature smile — “We have always played live.”
And that is why Mirage has survived, thrived, and continues to rock — from Colombo to Dubai, from Europe to Seychelles, and now — Australia!
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